An Appreciative Comment on Coase\u27s The Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left by Schlag, Pierre
University of Colorado Law School
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship
1986
An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The
Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left
Pierre Schlag
University of Colorado Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
Copyright Statement
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and Educational Use clauses of the U.S.
Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
erik.beck@colorado.edu.
Citation Information
Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's the Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 919,
available at http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1016/.
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation:
Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's the
Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 Wis.
L. Rev. 919, 962 (1986)


Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Sep 22 18:08:33 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
                                     Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
                                     your smartphone or tablet device 
AN APPRECIATIVE COMMENT ON COASE'S THE
PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST: A VIEW FROM THE LEFT
PIERRE SCHLAG*
Professor Coase's article, The Problem of Social Cost, played a significant role
in launching the law and economics movement. Coase's insights have been used ex-
tensively by the law and economics movement as authority and inspiration for the
development of an essentially ight-leaning approach to law. In this Article, Professor
Schlag undertakes to reexamine the original article. He shows that Coase's decon-
structive moves opened up a series of volatile and radical inquiries. He then argues
that the law and economics movement, in general, and Judge Posner, in particular,
shut down the dangerous radicalism of these inquiries by hypostasizing Coase's in-
sights and formalizing Coase's approach into a set of stereotyped formulae. By ap-
peal to Coase's original insights, Professor Schlag demonstrates that the claims of the
right to exclusivity in Coase's approach are unjustified. He concludes by showing that
Coase's insights can yield some left-leaning implications for the understanding of law
and its relation to economics.
In this Article, the analysis has been confined, as is usual
in this part of economics, to comparisons of the value of pro-
duction, as measured by the market. But it is, of course, desir-
able that the choice between different social arrangements for
the solution of economic problems should be carried out in
broader terms than this and that the total effect of these ar-
rangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account.
As Frank H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of wel-
fare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthet-
ics and morals.
Ronald Coase t
Human beings are not 'individuals' to begin with... The val-
ues of life are not, in the main, reducible to satisfactions ob-
tained from the consumption of exchangeable goods and ser-
vices. Such desires as people have for goods and services are
not their own in any original sense, but are the product of
social influence of inumerable kinds and of every moral grade,
* Associate Professor, University of Puget Sound School of Law. B.A., Yale University
1975; J.D. UCLA School of Law, 1978. I wish to express my appreciation to Tom Holdych,
Deborah Maranville, Michael Newcity, David Skover and Andrew Walkover for their helpful
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1,43 (1960) (emphasis added).
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
largely manufactured by the competitive system itself. The
productive capacities in their own persons and in owned ex-
ternal things which form the ultimate stock in trade of the
human being are derived from an uncertain mixture of consci-
entious effort, inheritance, pure luck and outright force and
fraud. He cannot be well or truly informed regarding the mar-
kets for the productive power he possesses, and the informa-
tion which he gets has a way of coming to him after the time
when it would be of use. The business organizations which are
the directing divinities of the system are but groups of igno-
rant and frail beings like the individuals with whom they deal.
(In the perfectly ideal order of theory the problem of manage-
ment would be nonexistent!) The system as a whole is depen-
dent upon an outside organization, an authoritarian state,
made up also of ignorant and frail human beings, to provide a
setting in which it can operate at all. Besides watching over
the dependent and non-contracting, the state must define and
protect property rights, enforce contract and prevent noncon-
tractual (compulsory) transactions, maintain a circulating
medium, and most especially prevent that collusion and mo-
nopoly, the antithesis of competition, into which competitive
relations constantly tend to gravitate. It is in the field indi-
cated by this summary list of postulates, rather than in that of
the mechanics of exchange relations, that we must work the
ultimate critique of free enterprise.
Frank H. Knight2
I. INTRODUCTION
To suggest that a perspective from the left has anything apprecia-
tive to say about the article which launched the law and economics
movement may seem bewildering.3 The left has not been (and is un-
likely to be, any time soon) particularly appreciative of the law and
economics movement or its program. But that is history. And I want to
put history and its ironies aside if only for a moment to consider the
insights of Coase's article independently of their deployment by the law
and economics movement. (Part II). As will be seen, Coase's creative
Z. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 QUART. J. ECON. 582,
605-06 (1924).
3. Posner, for instance, traces the origin of the law and economics movement back to
Coase's, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note I and Calabresi's, Some Thoughts on Risk Distri-
bution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 19
(3d ed. 1986).
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insights opened up a series of volatile inquiries. (Part III). Despite their
volatile nature, these insights were internalized by the right-wing law
and economics movement. As an examination of Judge Posner's brand
of law and economics will show, the right managed to rationalize and
formalize the productivity of the Coasian insights. (Part IV). This rela-
tively uncontested and virtually exclusive exploitation of Coase's in-
sights by the right was a normal and predictable development--even
though it shows clear signs of intellectual market failure. Indeed, the
right eclipsed the more radical thrusts of Coase's article and the left did
not appropriate them. (Parts V & VI). In the end, however, the claims
of the right to exclusivity in Coase's insights are unjustified and Coase's
seminal article (as the quotes above indicate) ultimately refers us to the
questions that the left seeks to address. (Part VII).
II. THE COASIAN INSIGHTS
Few articles in the recent past have had more significance for legal
thought than The Problem of Social Cost.4 In that piece, Ronald Coase
turned welfare economics on its head by devastating the received wis-
dom that legal rules should be designed so as to "internalize externali-
ties." Until Coase's piece emerged, it was widely believed (in economi-
cally attuned circles) that law should compel an activity which visits
undesirable externalities upon another to take those costs into ac-
count.5 Thus, for instance, a polluting factory should be made to take
into account the costs of its smoke (an undesirable externality) upon the
candy store next door.6 Likewise, a railroad should be made to take
into account the costs of crop fires caused by the sparks of its locomo-
4. Coase, supra note 1.
5. Even at Chicago, the Pigovian injunction that legal rules should be structured to
internalize the externalities was accepted wisdom. Stigler recalls Coase's initial presentation of his
views at a faculty seminar.
[I]t contained Aaron [Director], Milton [Friedman], John McGee, Gregg Louis, Reuben
Kessel, Al Harberger, Martin Bailey. It was a collection of theorists who were simply
superb. At the beginning of the evening we took a vote and there were twenty votes for
Pigou and one for Ronald [Coase], and if Ronald had not been allowed to vote, it would
have been even more one-sided. The discussion began.... At the end of that evening the
vote had changed. There were twenty-one votes for Ronald and no votes for Pigou.
Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J. LAW
& ECON. 163, 221 (1983) (comments of George Stigler). Judge Posner, cautions, however, that
Pigou had little impact on legal scholarship. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 20.
6. Roughly stated, an externality is a benefit or a cost visited by one party upon another
without compensation. The meaning and significance of the term before Coase was elusive. See,
e.g., Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL. ECON. 143 (1954). One typical
definition prior to Coase's article was:
External effects exist in consumption whenever the shape or position of a man's indiffer-
ence curve depends on the consumption of other men. [External effects] are present
whenever a firm's production function depends in some way on the amounts of the inputs
or outputs of another firm.
1986:919
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tives. The received Pigovian wisdom suggested that smoke is a cost of
manufacturing and fires are a cost of railroads; legal rules were thus to
be structured to make the offending activities (manufacturing and rail-
roading) bear the full costs of their offenses.7 This bit of economic
thought, of course, converged with established common law principles
which found moral difference between operating a candy story or grow-
ing corn on the one hand and polluting the air or starting fires, on the
other."
Coase's article shattered this happy coincidence between Pigovian
welfare economics and these common law principles.9 Coase noted that
where it is costless for two parties engaged in conflicting activities to
negotiate and enforce an agreement, the parties will always reach the
efficient mix of activities regardless of which activity is initially pro-
tected by a rule of law.' ° If it is costless to negotiate and enforce an
agreement (i.e. if there are no transaction costs) then by definition it is
costless for the parties to reassign any initial entitlement bestowed by
law. And if there are no transaction costs, then each party, in making
rational economic decisions, must consider not only the returns made
from engaging in her or his own activity, but the returns that could be
made by curtailing the activity in exchange for payment from the other
party."' 1
One simple implication of Coase's insights then is that so long as
the various regimes (legal or otherwise) under consideration yield negli-
gible transaction costs, the choice among these regimes is efficiency neu-
Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962) (citing J. DE V. GRAAF, THEORETI-
CAL WELFARE ECONOMICS 18, 43 (1957)).
7. The injunction that legal rules and policy aim at internalizing externalities is attrib-
uted to A. C. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932) by Coase. Coase, supra
note 1, at 28.
8. Coase's suggestions about the relation of common law decisions and economic prin-
ciples (his own and those of Pigou) are somewhat ambivalent. See infra note 15. But see, R. Pos-
NER, supra note 3, at 20 (noting that Coase suggested that the English law of nuisance had an
implicit economic logic).
9. For a provocative article suggesting that the psychological structure of Coase's in-
sights are incompatible with the psychological commitments of lay persons and the common law,
see Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 711 (1983).
10. Coase, supra note 1, at 6; P. BURROWS & C.G. VELJANOVSKI, THE ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH TO LAW 10 (1981).
II. Coase, supra note I, at 2-8. Coase's argument is based on the concept of opportunity
cost: the cost of engaging an activity is the price that the production factors would obtain in their
next best use. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 6-7.
Of course, there are some limitations on Coase's insights about what would happen in a
world without transaction costs. As Coase notes, it is necessary to know what legal regime is in
force since without an initial definition of rights, there can be no market transactions to transfer
and recombine these rights. And it is likewise clear that changes in legal regimes in a world without
transaction costs have wealth distribution effects. See, e.g., Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liabil-
ity Matter?, I J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 22 (1972).
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tral. As Coase notes, this sort of scenario is extremely unrealistic.12
And, as will be seen later, Coase's own arguments suggest good reasons
for thinking it is unrealistic.' 3
The bite of Coase's article, however, pertains to those choice situa-
tions where the possible regimes (legal and otherwise) do entail signifi-
cant transaction costs. These costs include information costs, negotia-
tion costs, policing and enforcement costs, various third party effects
such as the free rider and the holdout phenomena.' 4 When transaction
costs are significant, the choice among alternate legal regimes can have
efficiency effects. The reason is simple: when transaction costs are high
and the parties encounter difficulty altering the allocation of entitle-
ments imposed by law, that allocation may well remain the final one.
Transaction costs may well be so significant, that it is impossible for the
parties to circumvent the initial allocation imposed by law.
Coase's insights are the intellectual offspring of two powerful
deconstructive moves. One such moveis a frontal attack on the com-
mon law's traditional conception of causation. The common law in its
definition of contract, tort and property traditionally advances the no-
tion that whenever alternative resource uses conflict, one activity has
caused, and is thus responsible for the ensuing harm.' 5 By describing
12. Coase, supra note 1, at 15. And moreover, as Coase noted later,
[W]hile considerations of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can
give us valuable insights, these insights are, in my view, without value except as steps on
the way to the analysis of the real world of positive transaction costs. We do not do well
to devote ourselves to a detailed study of the world of zero transaction costs, like augurs
divining the future by the minute inspection of the entrails of a goose.
Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J. LAW & ECON. 183, 187 (1981).
13. See infra, note 36.
14. Given the singular importance of the concept of transaction costs in the legal litera-
ture, the original version is surely worth another glance:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to
conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so
on. These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent
many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system
worked without cost.
Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
i5. See H.L.A. HART& I. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 62-68 (2d ed. 1985) (discuss-
ing the importance of and the connection between causation and responsibility in law); id. at 84-86
(summarizing the role of causation in contract, tort and criminal law and noting that causation
questions are an element in the determination of responsibility).
I think there is probably room for disagreement about the extent to which the common law,
prior to the advent of the law and economics movement, relied on this traditional conception of
causation as opposed to a vision which more closely approximates Coase's insight into the recipro-
cal nature of harm. Coase, himself, was somewhat ambivalent about the extent to which the com-
mon law tracked his insights:
The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights will often seem strange
to an economist because many of the factors on which the decision turns are, to an
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affirmative causes of action and defenses, the common law establishes
standards and burdens by which the trier of fact can decide which of
two conflicting uses caused the harm and thus ought to bear the loss in
those economically unrewarding encounters.16 Coase liberates us from
these legal commitments by reminding us of the reciprocal nature of
conflicting resource use: the railroad no more caused the fire than did
the fanner who decided to grow corn next to the railroad tracks. Like-
wise, the factory no more caused damage to the candy store than did
the confectioner who continued operations when the factory moved
next door. Coase thus reminds us that the innate order of things is
rather mute when it comes to answering the question of who caused
what.' 7 According to Coase, then the problem for law is not to decide
who caused what, but to determine who shall be responsible for mini-
mizing the costs associated with unfortunate encounters. 1 8
Coase's insight into the reciprocal nature of harm runs contrary to
the quaint (though deeply mistaken) notion that common law princi-
ples are or can be drawn from the natural order of things.1 9 Few ten-
economist, irrelevant. Because of this, situations which are, from an economic point of
view, identical will be treated quite differently by the courts.
Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
A thorough examination of the presuppositions of the courts in trying such cases would
be of great interest but I have not been able to attempt it. Nevertheless it is clear from a
cursory study that the courts have often recognized the economic implications of their
decisions and are aware (as many economists are not) of the reciprocal nature of the
problem. Furthermore, from time to time, they take these economic implications into
account, along with other factors, in arriving at their decisions.
Id. at 19.
In a world in which there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the legal
system, the courts, in cases relating to nuisance, are, in effect, making a decision on the
economic problem and determining how resources are to be employed. It was argued
that the courts are conscious of this and that they often make, although not always in a
very explicit fashion, a comparison between what would be gained and what lost by
preventing actions which have harmful effect.
Id. at 27-28. One thing is clear: Coase thought that at least some of the time, the common law did
rely (erroneously) on concepts of linear causation ("Who caused the nuisance?") to decide liability.
Id. at 13.
16. Property law tends to discharge this function by establishing a status hierarchy of
entitlements and notions of who complied with the necessary formalities to perfect the entitlement
first. Tort law generally implements conceptions of fault and blameworthiness to define the stan-
dards for attributing harm. Contract law relies essentially on the private legislation of the parties
to furnish the context for attributing harm to one activity or the other.
17. Coase's attack on the traditional conception of causation is reminiscent of Felix
Cohen's earlier attack upon the circular reifications of legal formalism. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 820 (1935). For a provocative
discussion of the contemporary significance of Cohen's article, see Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151 (1985).
18. Coase, supra note 1, at 14-15.
19. See Cohen, supra note 17, at 809-12 (discussing the inadequacy of deciding the juris-
dictional power of a court over corporations by asking such questions as "Where is a corpora-
tion?" "Was this corporation really in Pennsylvania or in New York, or could it be in two places at
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dencies in the common law have been more pernicious than this one.
The common sense intuitions of the common law about which types of
activities cause harm are at best a crude reflection of political, economic
or moral judgments. Not only are these intuitions parasitic and deriva-
tive, but they are also impervious to intellectual exploration. If in un-
fortunate encounters, both conflicting activities cause the harm, as
Coase maintains, then it is pointless and nonsensical to ask which one
really and truly caused the harm. Instead, we should ask a question we
are capable of answering: which activity should be responsible for
avoiding the costs associated with unfortunate encounters. This is a
very different question-for it can be answered in political, moral or
economic terms. For Coase, the mission of law is not to defer value
choices to some mystical vision of the natural order of things, but to
decide what this order should be in light of what we can make of it.20
The common sense of the common law, by contrast, owes its parentage
to metaphysics or nonsense. 2'
Coase's second important deconstructive move is a contribution to
the dialectical view of law.2 2 In contrast to much common law think-
ing, Coase insisted that proposed solutions to a conflicting use problem
should be evaluated by examining how the solutions would affect the
conflicting uses in their totality.23 The failure to examine all these ef-
fects was a mistake prevalent not only in the common law but in the
Pigovian prescriptions that decisionmakers should internalize the unde-
once?"). Felix Cohen described this propensity of courts to answer normative legal questions by
reference to the natural order as a conceptual reification: the treatment of legal concepts as if they
were empirical entities.
20. As Coase suggests,
A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation approximating
that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change and to
attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the
original one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual
situation.
Coase, supra note 1, at 43.
21. Coase concludes one of his discussions of the English common law treatment of
conflicting resource use with the observation that many of the factors employed in legal reasoning
to determine legal rights are irrelevant from an economic point of view. Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
22. A useful starting point for an introduction to the dialectical thought is S. WARREN,
THE EMERGENCE OF DIALEMCTICAL THEORY (1984)--particularly at 182-98, which contains a sketch
of dialectical thought. For examples of dialectical approaches to law, see Cornell, Toward a Mod-
ern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1985); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L. Rv. 379 (1985).
23. Coase, supra note 1, at 44. By contrast, "[t]he classical theories of private and crimi-
nal law support the view that courts should focus exclusively on the merits of the case before
them." Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1263, 1292 (1985). See infra
notes 120-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited perspective of the analytical
reasoning process used in common law decisionmaking.
1986:919
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sirable externalities of the offending activity.24 Not only did Coase rec-
ognize (with rather devastating effect) that both conflicting activities
are implicated in the production of undesirable externalities, but he also
recognized that where transaction costs are significant (and cannot be
eliminated) any attempt to reduce the undesirable externalities of one
activity will likely increase the production of undesirable externalities
by the other.25
By drawing attention to this feedback loop, Coase advanced a dia-
lectical vision of the relation between a legal problem and its solution.26
Suppose that a railroad operates its trains without regard for the fire
risk posed by the locomotive sparks to the corn fields. Suppose also that
the railroad and the farmers cannot negotiate an agreement to deal with
this problem. If the railroad is not liable, it has no incentive to prevent
such fires and the fires will continue. The Pigovian solution is to "inter-
nalize the externalities" by imposing liability on the railroad.27 Pigou
promised that efficiency would be achieved if the railroad is made to
bear "the full cost of its activity." Coase exposed the deception in this
promise by showing that liability may result in an underproduction of
railway service and a sort of "moral hazard" problem on the part of
farmers who will plant dangerously close to those rail tracks.28 Because
the transaction costs are significant, the railroad liability regime may
well not be the optimal one: to decide whether it is, Coase notes that we
must look at the effect that the change in legal regime will have on the
rate of production of both activities. We cannot blindly assume that the
change in legal regime will affect only the rate of production of the
externality.29
The feedback loop demonstrates that in deciding upon a legal rule,
we cannot assume that the only thing we are changing is the matter that
is subject to the rule. In our example, a rule imposing liability on rail-
roads for crop fires affects the rate of railway service and crop produc-
tion. The rate of railway service and crop production in turn affects the
frequency (and perhaps severity) of crop fires. Thus, Coase recognized
that adoption of a solution would have a wide scale effect, not only on
the matters encompassed by the solution, but also on the background
24. Coase, supra note 1, at 34.
25. Coase, supra note I, at 32-34. A similar insight had been voiced before by Frank
Knight: "The portion of the productive process carried on in a particular [technical production]
unit is an accidental consideration. External economies in one business unit are internal economies
in some other, within the industry." Knight, supra note 2, at 597. As Coase himself has noted,
Frank Knight was an important influence on his work. Kitch, supra note 5, at 213.
26. See supra note 22.
27. A.C. PiGou, supra note 7, at 183-92.
28. Coase, supra note 1, at 32-33.
29. Id. at 32-34.
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conditions which allowed the problem to arise (and to be stated) in the
first place.3 °
III. TiH ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE COASIAN INSIGHTS
Coase's devastation of Pigovian welfare economics, his view of the
reciprocal nature of unfortunate encounters, and his description of the
feedback loop, lead to a number of important ideas for legal decision-
making and rulemaking.31 In fairness to Coase, I must note that The
Problem of Social Cost did not crystallize his insights into prescriptive
criteria for the construction of legal rules.32 Still, I think that Coase's
article might be stretched (in increasing order of stretch) to suggest the
following:
1. Where the various legal rules under consideration will not
produce significant transaction costs, the choice will not
have implications for the allocation of resources and/or
efficiency. 33
2. Where at least one of the legal rules under consideration,
including the present state of affairs, would yield signifi-
cant transaction costs, the choice will have resource alloca-
tion and/or efficiency implications.
30. Later, the same sort of dialectical insight would be stated by Leff in a universal (and
more nihilistic) form: "If a state of affairs is the product of n variables, and you have knowledge of
or control over less than n variables, if you think you know what's going to happen when you vary
'your' variables, you're a booby." Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominal-
ism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 476 (1974).
31. Although caution is required: Coase was an economist and was most interested in
the relation of law to economics for its implications upon the latter, not the former. Kitch, supra
note 5, at 192-93. Coase has said, "I do think some knowledge of legal institutions is essential for
economists working in certain areas, but it's what it does to economists that interests me, not what
it does to lawyers." Id. at 193.
32. In terms of positive prescriptions, Coase seems to have limited his statements to the
most general advice about how to conceptualize and resolve problems. See supra note 20 and infra
note 160.
33. This is as close as Coase's article comes to stating his theorem:
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage caused
since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no mar-
ket transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which maxi-
mizes the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is
assumed to work without cost.
Coase, supra note 1, at 8. The economic interpreters of this statement can be divided into two main
camps. There are those who claim that in a world of zero transaction costs, the choice of legal
regime does not affect the mix ofgoods produced. And there are those who, in addition, claim that
in such a world, the choice of legal regime does not affect efficiency. C.G. VELJANOVSKI, TH-E NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIcs 49 (1982). For a more elaborate survey of the various interpretations ac-
corded by economists to Coase's insights, see Veljanovski, The Coase Theorem and the Economic
Theory of Markets and Law, 35 KYKLOS 53 (1982).
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3. Where the various options in designing legal rules will nec-
essarily result in significant transaction costs, legal rules
should be structured so as to:
a. redefine initial entitlements to minimize the loss associ-
ated with the transaction costs and/or34
b. approximate the sort of welfare enhancing agreements
that would be reached in the absence of transaction
costs.
35
I have some doubts that the third proposition is fairly attributable to
Coase's article-but let us assume, arguendo that it is. 36 As a whole
these propositions suggest lines of inquiry across a wide array of mat-
34. This imperative as well as the next one are sometimes attributed to Coase. There is
some support for this view where Coase, states, "Even when it is possible to change the legal
delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously desirable to reduce the need for
such transactions and thus reduce the employment of resources in carrying them out." Coase,
supra note 1, at 19. But see infra note 36. On the derivation of similar approaches from Coase's
article see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 34. This approach has been popularized by Judge Posner under the
name of "hypothetical market". R. PosEt, THE EcoNoMics OF JUSTICE 61-65 (1981). In turn,
Posner's notion of "hypothetical markets" is derived from the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 12-15. A reallocation of resources is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the win-
ners receive an increase in value sufficiently large so that they could fully compensate the losers.
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 239-42 (1980). See Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).
Again, there are some doubts about whether the proposition in the text can be fairly attrib-
uted to Coase's article. Indeed, it is hardly clear that the article provides such definitive prescrip-
tions. See infra note 36. With regard to transaction cost problems, Coase does say that "What has
to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be
suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm." Coase, supra note
1, at 27.
36. I will argue later that with regard to determinate prescriptions for legal rules, Coase's
article says less than many of his right-wing interpreters' claim. See text accompanying infra notes
52-96. In my view, however, a better interpretation of Coase's article is that in the presence of
significant transaction costs, there are several options: the market, the firm, and government
regulation.
All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that government regulation is
called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm....
But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regu-
lation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency....
It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-esti-
mate the advantages which come from governmental regulation. But this belief, even if
justified, does not do more than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed.
It does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems to me, has to
come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in differ-
ent ways. But it would be unfortunate if this investigation were undertaken with the aid
of a faulty economic analysis. The aim of this article is to indicate what the economic
approach to the problem should be.
Coase, supra note 1, at 18-19. But see supra note 34.
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ters relevant to the rule of law. To be sure, some of Coase's core con-
cepts and their interrelations bear a great deal of conceptual responsi-
bility. And his article does not promise that they will be able to
discharge their theoretical obligations. But that is virtue, not vice - as
will be seen.
One theoretical difficulty relates to the definition of transaction
costs. Coase's article presents examples of transaction costs, but leaves
the concept undefined and unlimited.37 (Most of the popular law and
economics writers have left the concept in the same shape since.)38 The
absence of a definition or a limit for the concept is, of course, no small
problem: indeed, that absence makes it difficult to decide whether some
cost is an inherent cost of production which the law should (perhaps)
refrain from subsidizing or whether it is instead a "legitimate" transac-
tion cost and thus eligible for Coasian legal aid. 9
Rather vexingly, this problem of delimiting transaction costs turns
out to be the displaced replication of the problem that Coase sought to
avoid with his reciprocal vision of harm. In the Pigovian world, we were
told to internalize externalities. This imperative raised a terrible prob-
lem in deciding "what is a cost of what?" Enter Coase-who disposes of
this problem with his reciprocal notion of harm and who intimates that
the question, "what is a cost of what?" is sheer nonsense. But now,
Coase requires us to answer a suspiciously similar question: is a cost an
("intrinsic") cost of production or is it some ("external") transaction
cost? Or to phrase the question in more general terms, is a cost attribut-
able to the system of coordination for production, or is it attributable
to the production which occurs within that system of coordination?
Under either formulation, the question bears an uncanny resemblance
37.' See supra note 14 for Coase's illustration of the concept of transaction costs.
38. See, e.g., A. M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1983)
("In general, transaction costs include the costs of identifying the parties with whom one has to
bargain, the cost of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining process itself, and the
costs of enforcing any bargain reached."). As actually used by the courts and commentators, the
term "transaction costs" seems to include any friction which precludes the attainment of efficiency.
C.G. VELJANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMICS supra note 33, at 52-53. As Veljanovski notes
this definition is tautological. Veljanovski, The Coase Theorems and the Economic Theory of Mar-
kets, supra note 33, at 57. For a discussion of the difficulties attending the delimitation of the
concept of transaction costs, see id. at 57-67.
39. This is no small problem. Consider, for instance, information acquisition. In part,
obstructions in information acquisition can be considered a transaction cost precluding efficient
transfers. The implication might be that we should develop legal rules to reduce information acqui-
sition costs. But information acquisition is also supplied by a market. There are firms and entire
industries which devote substantial resources to the production and acquisition of information.
One implication of this observation might be that information production and acquisition is just
another factor of production and elimination of these costs by legal rules would supplant market
determined efficiencies in information production and acquisition. See Barzel, Transaction Costs:
Are They Just Costs?, 141 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENscHAFr 4, 13-14 (1985);
Veljanovski, The Coase Theorem and the Economic Theory of Markets, supra note 33, at 63-69.
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to the impossible question Pigou forced us to ask and Coase sought to
avoid: "what is a cost of what?"
Of course, Coase's notion of reciprocity can be invoked to resolve
this problem: whether some cost is a cost of production or instead a cost
of the system of coordination within which production occurs is the
wrong question. The problem is a reciprocal one. The real question is
whether we should retain the system of coordination and leave produc-
tion within this system to respond to the cost or whether we should alter
production by restructuring the system of coordination.4 ° The problem
is to avoid the more serious harm.4" Framed this way, of course, the
problem has radical dimensions.42
Another problem with Coase's brave new world arises when we
decide that transaction costs are significant. In such circumstances the
basic options are to redefine the initial legal entitlements in a way which
minimizes transaction costs or to take the opposite approach and at-
tempt to replicate by law the sort of agreement we think would have
occurred in the absence of transaction costs. This problem has signifi-
cant implications because the two approaches lead to opposite ex-
tremes.4" The redefinition of initial entitlements is aimed at lowering
40. Or phrased differently: the real question that has to be decided is whether we should
treat it as a cost of production or as a cost of the system of coordination.
41. This is, of course, an extended paraphrase of the original Coasian notion of the
reciprocity of harm:
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be
made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and
what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing
with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.
The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be
allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.
Coase, supra note i, at 2.
42. See infra notes 124-60 and accompanying text.
43. It is interesting to compare, for instance, Posner's recommendations when transac-
tion costs are low with his recommendations when such costs are high. "Absolute rights play an
important role in the economic theory of the law. The economist recommends the creation of such
rights-to ideas, land or labor, for example-when the costs of voluntary transactions are low,
.... But when transaction costs are prohibitive, the recognition of absolute rights is inefficient." R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 70 (198 1). Instead, where transaction costs are prohibitive,
Posner believes "that in many cases a court can make a reasonably accurate guess as to the alloca-
tion of resources that would maximize wealth." Id. at 62. See also R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 14.
So in essence, Posner offers two radically different approaches. Where transactions costs are
low, absolute rights granted to the highest valued user are appropriate. Where transaction costs
are high, the court should replicate the market transaction that would have occurred absent trans-
action costs. The two regimes are obviously not fungible and hardly allow for any easily discerni-
ble middle ground. The identification of transaction costs as high or low thus becomes critical in
the choice of regime. In turn, the definition of the market (that which is or would be traded)
becomes critical to the assessment of whether transaction costs are high or low. The very difficulty
in making these determinations perhaps explains why Coase referred welfare economics "to a
study of aesthetics and morals." See Coase, supra note 1.
To complicate matters, it is even more difficult to decide upon a legal regime if the transac-
tion costs are neither low nor high, but sort of "middle": almost prohibitive but not quite. In those
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transactions costs and permitting bargains. The other approach, by
constrast, replicates rather than facilitates market transactions and ac-
cordingly raises transaction costs significantly. Rather vexingly, there
may be no happy medium combining the two approaches in a manner
that enhances welfare. On the contrary, in most problems that come
before the courts, the welfare enhancing solutions are likely to be found
at the extremes-not in some cheerful middle.
Choosing which of the two extreme approaches to follow in any
given case is difficult. A sensible choice would require some understand-
ing of the relation between private and social values and the extent to
which we can make collective judgments about the latter without too
much evidence of the former." If social value is nothing more than the
aggregate of private market valuations, then perhaps it is sound to pre-
fer the minimization of transaction costs over court-imposed bar-
gains.45 But if social value is not simply the aggregate of private market
valuations, the answer is quite unclear: where the aggregate of private
market valuations and social value diverge, the realization of the latter
might well require supplanting the market. The reason for resisting the
hypothesis that private market valuations are exhaustive of social value
is that the operation of the market itself can be seen as skewing private
market valuations by producing false needs and brutalized human be-
ings.4 6 The relation of private value to social value is obviously a very
difficult question. What must be noted is that the answer given is itself a
matter of social value.47
situations, it is extremely difficult to decide which of the two incompatible approaches to follow.
An interesting, problem would arise if it turned out that the controversial, interesting or important
questions in law were most often framed in a context attended by "middle" transaction costs.
44. As Posner himself notes, in order to say that even voluntary market transfers are
efficient, it is necessary "that everyone affected by the transaction be a party to it, and this require-
ment is almost never satisfied." R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 13. The question of how private valua-
tions may be evidenced for purposes of making efficiency judgments is far from clear. Id. at I 1-15.
45. And Posner clearly favors this approach: "Since, however, the determination of
value made by a court is less accurate than that made by a market, the hypothetical-market ap-
proach should be reserved for cases, such as the typical accident case, where market-transaction
costs preclude use of an actual market to allocate resources efficiently." R. POSNER, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 62.
46. See supra text accompanying note 2. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
Generally, however, microeconomists assume that individual preferences are stable. As Becker
states, "Since economists generally have had little to contribute, especially in recent times, to the
understanding of how preferences are formed, preferences are assumed not to change substantially
over time, nor to be very different between wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in
different societies and cultures." G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5
(1976).
47. To anticipate the conclusion of this Article, I think that the question of how private
and social value are related ought to be treated in Coasian terms: the problem is of a reciprocal
nature, implicates a feedback loop and ought to be assessed from the perspective of the totality.
See infra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
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The specter of a divergence between the aggregate of private mar-
ket valuations and social value, of course, raises problems even when
transaction costs are minimal. If there is a divergence, then it may well
be welfare enhancing for the courts to intervene and create all sorts of
transaction costs that will effectively prevent "voluntary exchanges."
For his part, Coase did not speak of social value or private value. In-
deed, he resisted making statements about social cost and its relation to
private costs.
48
It is a singular virtue of Coase's article that it makes no attempt to
definitively resolve these problems. Instead, Coase maintained a
healthy distance from and skepticism about the application of his in-
sights. This distance and this skepticism give the article its intellectual
power. As will be seen later, the lessons Coase has to impart are not
merely relevant to microeconomic theory as traditionally understood.
They have something to offer in the way of a general methodology for
explaining and understanding the development of law.49 And the Coa-
sian insights have something to offer to "non-economic" moral and
aesthetic approaches to law as well. But then again, Coase told as
much: "As Frank Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare
economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and
morals."5"
Economists are fond of saying that the economic approach has
something to say about all values and all spheres of life.5 In Part VI, I
plan to take them at their word. I think that Coase's approach has
much to say about the moral and aesthetic aspects of law. And it has
something to say about its own status as the near-exclusive property of
the right.
48. For his part, Coase stayed away from the concept of social cost, except of course, in
the title of his article. "In fact, I would say that the title of my paper came from Frank Knight and
the title of the paper was rather to indicate the topic I was talking about, because, of course, I don't
think the concept of social cost is a very useful one and I don't ever refer to it." Comments of
Ronald Coase in Kitch, supra note 5, at 215. See supra notes 12, 20. See infra note 160.
49. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
50. Coase, supra note 1, at 43. See supra text accompanying notes 125-60.
51.
Indeed, I have come to the position that the economic approach is a comprehensive one
that is applicable to all human behavior, be it behavior involving money prices or im-
puted shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or minor decisions, emo-
tional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, adults or children, bril-
liant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, businessmen or politicians, teachers or
students. The applications of the economic approach so conceived are as extensive as the
scope of economics in the definition given earlier that emphasizes scarce means and com-
peting ends.
G. BECKER, supra note 46, at 8. But note that economists typically assume the stability of individ-
ual preferences. See supra note 46.
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IV. THE RIGHT-WING APPROPRIATION OF COASE'S INSIGHTS
My attempts to set forth what Coase said (and refrained from say-
ing) in The Problem of Social Cost are very much an essay in intellectual
retrieval-for Coase's insights have become canonized in what is popu-
larly known as "the Coase Theorem". The popularization of Coase's
thought in legal circles was accomplished primarily by right-wing law
and economics scholars-who were probably more subservient to the
demands of legal decisionmaking than to the integrity of economic
thought. The result was a neoclassical and normative gloss on the Coa-
sian insights.5 2 As a rule, lawyers like their theory to be serviceable, to
be clear and to be consistent. The right-wing law and economics schol-
ars obliged, but in translating Coase into some instrumentally servicea-
ble rules of thumb, they used an ideological razor:
HOW THE BECAME
COASIAN INSIGHTS RIGHT-WING FOLKLORE
1. Where the various legal rules Courts should not interfere with
under consideration will not pro- or disaffirm market transac-
duce significant transaction costs, tions. 53
the choice will not have implica-
tions for the allocation of re-
sources and/or efficiency.
2. Where at least one of the legal Where the situation is one where
rules under consideration, includ- transaction costs are high, the
ing present state of affairs, would choice of legal regime will have ef-
52.
Although, as I have pointed out elsewhere, transaction cost analysis is not in itself neo-
classical microeconomic analysis, it is nevertheless so closely associated with such analy-
sis-and is so essential to endow microeconomic analysis with some degree of both sense
and reality-that the two often go hand in hand.... Thus, it is appropriate to include the
transaction cost school under the heading of neoclassical microeconomics.
Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 495-96. But
see Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1201 (1984) (suggesting that neoclassi-
cal economics, which views the firm as a production function, treats non-standard forms of organi-
zation as having monopoly purposes or effects, while transaction cost economics views firms, mar-
kets and hybrids as alternative governance structures).
53.
[Tihere is the evidentiary point that willingness to pay can be determined with great
confidence only by actually observing a voluntary transaction. Where resources are
shifted pursuant to a voluntary transaction, we can be reasonably sure that the shift
involves an increase in efficiency. The transaction would not have occurred if both parties
had not expected it to make them better off. This implies that the resources transferred
are more valuable in their new owner's hands.
R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 13.
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yield significant transaction costs,
the choice will have resource allo-
cation and/or efficiency implica-
tions.
3. Where the reallocation of enti-
tlements through the market en-
tails significant transaction costs
there are a number of possible re-
sponses...
" the firm
" government intervention
" doing nothing at all
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ficiency implications." 4
Where the situation is one where
transaction costs are high...
* the optimal solution is to
(re)assign the legal entitlement so
as to minimize transaction costs55
and/or
* approximate the bargains that
would have been made on a free
market by the maximum sum of
dollar-choices if there had been no
transaction costs.56
54. "When transaction costs are high, legal rules produce efficient results only if they
prescribe the result the parties would have arrived at had they been able to reach a bargain."
Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14 n. 13 (1984).
55.
What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing
the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting persons is too high to
make it worthwhile, and this is what the term shall mean here .... One condition is
necessary to make costs and benefits externalities. The cost of a transaction in the rights
between the parties [internalization] must exceed the gains from internalization.
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv., Papers & Proc. 347, 356-57
(1967) (Demsetz argues that various property regimes develop in ways that aim at internalizing
externalities).
The normative basis for deciding whether to adopt or retain any particular regulatory
program depends on whether the program increases social welfare by lowering transac-
tion costs or by replicating the effects of market exchanges that might occur only if trans-
action costs were lower.
Diver, Regulating the Regulators (Book Review), 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1243, 1249-50 (1984).
56. "The right inquiry is always what the parties would have contracted for had transac-
tion costs been zero." Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L.
Ray. 271, 298 (1986).
The need for much of tort law arises from the existence of transactions costs. Often such
costs are so high that no real [that is, negotiated] contract is possible at all, and yet
individuals, if they could overcome these barriers, would make mutually advantageous
bargains. Here the state comes to the aid of these individuals. It writes into law the terms
they would have agreed to if they could have bargained.
Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1983)
(citing Coase, supra note 1).
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The right-wing lawyer-economists, in their attempts, to make the Coa-
sian insights serviceable for lawyers and judges eclipsed the original and
creative ambiguity which these insights had originally possessed.
One significant alteration was the transformation of Coase's de-
scriptive theory into a serviceable prescriptive (and in some cases, ex-
plicitly normative) model for legal decisionmaking. On the intellectual
plane, this remains a stunning transformation-for Coase's article, as
George Priest notes, is rather nihilistic.57 Indeed, Coase's article sug-
gests that economic thought has precious little to contribute in the way
of prescriptions for law. Instead, Coase offers us a way of thinking
about legal rules and offers some insights about the alternative types of
coordinating arrangements that can be used: the firm, the market and
the government. But that's it: Coase did not dispense legal
prescriptions.
Closely related to the "normative" reading given the Coase article
is the right-wingers' conflation of social and private value. For the
right-wing lawyer-economists, social value is nothing but the sum of
private valuations actually registered on a market or the sum of private
valuations they think would be registered on a market but for the pres-
ence of transaction costs.5" This abbreviation of Coase's insights is an
immensely useful move for the lawyer-economists because it permits
prescription of legal rules based upon an assessment of what sorts of
market transactions would likely occur absent transaction costs.59 In
turn, this sort of assessment can be given some plausibility by examin-
ing who has money to spend and what they would likely spend it on. It
takes no stretch of the imagination to recognize that it is primarily
those who have dollar votes (wealth) and visible market preferences
(clear taste preferences) who are likely to benefit most from this clever
reformulation.
A second move made by the right-wingers is to hypostatize Coase's
analysis by ascribing the presence of transaction costs to "situations"
"When [transaction] costs are high, the legal system should select the rule closest to this
joint-maximization outcome." Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 611, 623, n. 18 (1985) (citing Coase, supra note 1).
57. Priest, Gossiping About Ideas, 93 YALE L. J. 1625, 1635 (1984) (reviewing B. ACKER-
MAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1985)).
58. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 11-15 (adopting registered market transactions
and the Kaldor-Hicks test as the measure of efficiency).
59. It is an abbreviation of Coase's insights in that it reifies the concept of market. Coase
gives no indication in his article that it is possible for an actual market to function costlessly. On
the contrary, Coase advocated a comparative assessment of the costs entailed by firms, the market
and the government as alternative coordinating mechanisms. Coase, supra note 1, at 18. See supra
note 36. The notion of a market without transaction costs is for Coase a heuristic tool, not a
representation of actual pricing markets. See supra note 12. There is simply no reason to assume
that there are no transaction costs associated with price markets. See infra note 132 and text ac-
companying notes 125-32.
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rather than to the dynamic relation of consumer preferences, legal rules
and other coordination mechanisms.6" Coase, by contrast, was careful
to note that transaction costs do not inhere in "situations", but rather
are related to legal rules and regimes. 6 Thus, if agreements between the
railroads and farmers are precluded by high transaction costs, that is
not simply a function of the geographic proximity of farms next to rail-
road tracks, but a function of the legal entitlements held by farmers and
railroads as well.62 The distinction is important because it is possible to
conceive of legal regimes where the transaction costs between farmers
and railroads would be trivial. (If the farmers were organized in a coop-
erative, rather than in individual firms, for instance, the transaction
costs might be insignificant.) The right-wing elision, however, serves to
excise the radicalism of Coase's approach: we are told that some situa-
tions present transaction cost problems and we are thus invited to for-
get that these transaction cost problems are traceable to the broad scale
legal entitlements that we created in the first place. But it is not Coase
who invitedus to forget this.
Still, even if the right-wing lawyer-economists eclipsed the subtlety
and ambivalence of Coase's insights, their product hardly warrants a
perfunctory dismissal. The right-wing, after all, played a significant role
in popularizing the Coasian insights. And among the right-wing law-
yer-economists, none has played a more visible or influential part than
Judge Posner. Posner's book, The Economic Analysis of Law, for in-
60. See text accompanying infra notes 65-89.
61. Thus, Coase took Pigou to task for distinguishing between the natural tendencies of
the market and state action and his recommendation that the latter be used to improve upon the
former. Coase, supra note 1, at 28-31. Coase, of course, realized that transaction costs are associ-
ated with of the entitlements (legal or otherwise) held by economic actors. In his conclusion, he
states:
A final reason for the failure to develop a theory adequate to handle the problem of
harmful effects stems from a faulty concept of a factor of production. This is usually
thought of as a physical entity which the businessman acquires and uses [an acre of land,
a ton of fertiliser] instead of as a right to perform certain [physical] actions. We may
speak of a person owning land and using it as a factor of production but what the land-
owner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions. The rights
of a land-owner are not unlimited.... For example, some people may have the right to
cross the land. Furthermore, it may or may not be possible to erect certain types of
buildings or to grow certain crops or to use particular drainage systems on the land. This
does not come about simply because of Government regulation. It would be true under
the common law. In fact it would be true under any system of law.... But in choosing
between social arrangements within the context of which individual decisions are
made.... we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various social
arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a government
department)....
Coase, supra note 1, at 44.
62. Most likely the transaction costs arise because the farmers adjoining the railway own
their own individual plot of land and are thus exceedingly costly to bargain with. Aside from the
costs of making numerous individual contracts, there are serious free rider problems (if the railway
is not liable) and holdout problems (if the railway is liable).
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stance, is a masterful application of the Coase Theorem across the mid-
west of the law.63 Over and over again, the Coasian insights are used
to:
6 4
rationalize an admonition that the government desist from
supplanting pricing markets and that courts cease from disaf-
firming bargained-for terms among private parties.65
rationalize the law's distribution and delimitation of initial
entitlements on the grounds that they are given to the highest
valued user.66
63. R. POSNER, supra note 3.
64. Not wishing to taxonomize the whole of Posner's book, I have limited myself to
Posner's first two chapters on the substantive law (property and contract) or roughly one hundred
pages of the text. See infra notes 65-74, which relate Posner's explanations or justifications for
specific legal rules with the structural economic principles or economic problems he indicates are at
stake.
The aim of this micro-taxonomic exercise is to demonstrate, that the economic architecture
(to the extent it provides determinate legal solutions) is not all that complex and that most of the
work of law and economics lies in knowing which economic principle or economic problem to
invoke when. That sort of knowledge, however, cannot be supplied by law and economics, but
must instead be borrowed from some moral, political or aesthetic architecture. Because (in con-
trast to Coase) law and economics scholars generally refuse to acknowledge the dependence of
their work on such foreign architectures, the formal economic principles deployed by law and
economics scholars such as Posner are extremely vulnerable to deviant interpretations.
65. Id. at 67 (questioning the efficiency of the Rule in Shelley's case and the Doctrine of
Worthier Title on the grounds that they are paternalistic and prevent the grantor from dividing
ownership in the ways the doctrines prevent); id. at 74 (suggesting that there is no basis for govern-
ment ownership of national parks); id. at 88 (rationale for refusal of courts to inquire into the
adequacy of consideration); id. at 96-97 (noting that contracting party should not have a gener-
alized obligation to disclose information unknown to the other party that affects the value of a
contract); id. at 103 (holder in due course provisions in consumer sales should be enforceable as the
consumer may prefer to give up legal remedies rather than pay a higher cost for the product pur-
chased); id. at 115 (noting that Hadley v. Baxendale rule limiting contract damages does not apply
where what is unforseeable is the other party's lost profit); id. at 116 (noting that penalty clauses in
contracts may be voluntarily negotiated provisions serving to communicate promissor's reliability
or compensating promissee for high risk of default).
66. Id. at 37-38 (explaining reason for the grant of trademark and the extinction of the
right when the mark becomes generic); id. at 38-39 (justification for extension of privacy right in
name and photographic likeness); id. at 40 (rationalizing a proposal to award FCC radio licenses
on the basis of auction or other sale and criticizing present system as only a partial approximation
of willingness to pay); id. at 46 (justifying English common law rule viz easement of light as against
adjacent construction but not distant obstructions); id. at 49 (rationale for power of eminent do-
main); id. at 56 (rationale for the non-absolute character of nuisance doctrine which allows pollu-
tion if reasonable under the circumstances); id. at 60 (restrictive covenants may well become obso-
lete and no longer reflect highest valued use and thus termination devices may be justified); id. at
84-85 (determination of whether some failure to carry through on undertaking is a breach of con-
tract depends upon whether liability will create incentives for value-maximizing conduct in the
future); id. at 117-18 (justifying use of specific performance serves as a substitute for damages
where there are no good market substitutes to permit easy valuation); id. at 119-21 (doctrines of
substantial performance and material breach serve to allocate contractual performance to the
highest valued user).
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rationalize legal rules on the grounds that they approximate
the agreements that the (relevant) parties would have reached
had they been able to bargain in the absence of transaction
costs.
6 7
rationalize legal rules on the grounds that they minimize the
transaction costs that the parties will have to encounter.68
The concept of transaction costs itself is refined and formalized into
some classic analytical constructs (that are also applied over and over
again):
free rider 69
67. Id. at 38 (explaining fair use doctrine in copyright law on the grounds that it en-
hances the value of the copyright to the owner); id. at 46-47 (justifying attractive nuisance doctrine
regarding child trespassers); id. at 68-69 (suggesting that limits on the transferability in Western
water rights and FCC licenses serve to protect third parties who may value these rights more); id.
at 81 (noting that implied term of good faith in contracts where one of the terms is within one
party's discretion approximates the agreement the parties would have made had they thought
about it); id. at 82-83 (in contract law where parties did not foresee a contingency or were pre-
cluded from dealing with it because of transaction costs, the role of the court is to imagine what the
parties would have agreed upon in the absence of transaction costs); id. at 90 (suggesting that the
doctrine of mutual mistake in contract law can be fruitfully approached in terms of how the parties
would have allocated the risk of the contingency had it been foreseen); id. at 93-94 (explaining the
contract doctrine of impossibility in terms of which party is the cheaper insurer of the risk); id. at
104 (rationale supporting admiralty rule which refuses to enforce salvage rescue agreements made
under duress and entitles salvor only to reasonable fee for saving the ship); id. at 113-14 (justifying
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale of consequential damages in that where only one party knows of
the risk, he/she can most cheaply insure or take other precautions against the realization of the
risk); id. at 122-23 (role of implied contract doctrine is to replicate agreement that would have been
reached had it been possible for parties to bargain).
68. Id. at 36-37 (explaining the grant of copyright and patent right in that both protect
returns on investment); id. at 58 (rationalizing compulsory unitization in oil and gas states which
allows a substantial majority of the owners of an oil and gas field to bind the minority as if under
common ownership); id. at 59 (explaining use of restrictive covenants as opposed to mere contracts
to govern land use); id. at 61 (explaining that restrictive covenants are only enforceable if the
promises "touch and concern" the land on grounds of facilitating market information and transfer
of land); id. at 64 (justifying the doctrine of waste to regulate the relation of the life tenant and the
remainderman); id. at 71 (denying purchaser valid title in stolen goods raises transaction costs for
operation of a market in stolen goods and presumably reduces transaction costs of preventing
theft); id. at 80-81 (suggesting that the fundamental function of contract law is to encourage the
optimal timing of economic activity and minimize the need for costly self-protective measures); id.
at 86 (doctrine of consideration in contracts minimizes transaction costs of those who want to deal
and those who don't by establishing formal regime for exchange); id. at 99 (failure to impose
liability for lies in contracts for the sale of goods would increase inspection and self-protection
costs); id. at 102 (standard form contracts should not be analyzed as a species of duress and should
be enforceable in that they minimize the transaction costs of negotiating and drafting separate
agreements); id. at 118 (justifying general preference for damage remedies over specific perform-
ance inasmuch as the latter increases transaction costs).
69. Id. at 55-56 (explaining undesirability of granting absolute property rights in pollu-
tion context and explaining nuisance doctrine that allows pollution if reasonable under the circum-
stances); id. at 60 (damage remedy as opposed to injunction remedy may be more appropriate to
avoid this problem when there is a change in land use).
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holdout/bilateral monopoly 70
information acquisition and production7 1
policing of agreements/detection of breach 72
valuation difficulties73
70. Id. at 49 (explaining power of eminent domain and criticizing its use where holdouts
are unlikely to be present--e.g. location of schools, post offices, etc.); id. at 56 (undesirability of
granting absolute property rights in pollution context served by nuisance doctrine that allows
pollution if reasonable under the circumstances); id. at 56 (compulsory unitization in oil and gas
states designed to avoid this problem); id. at 87 (doctrine of consideration in contract law prevents
opportunistic revisions of original agreement by party whose power is enhanced by the sequencing
of performance); id. at 104 (admiralty rule allowing salvagor only a reasonable fee for rescuing
ship in distress designed to avoid holdout problem); id. at 116 (suggesting that enforcing contrac-
tual penalty clauses may create a bilateral monopoly problem); id. at 118-19 (suggesting that spe-
cific performance can create a bilateral monopoly problem); id. at 120-22 (suggesting that the
doctrines of substantial performance and material breach serve to avoid bilateral monopoly
problems).
71. Id. at 36-37 (explaining grant of copyright and patent right); id. at 37-38 (explaining
grant of trademark protection and extinction of protection when mark becomes generic); id. at 61
(explaining that restrictive covenants are only enforceable if the promises "touch and concern" the
land on the grounds that otherwise buyers would not have easy access to information about what
they were buying); id. at 67 (suggesting that the possible inefficiencies stemming from the paternal-
ism of the Rule in Shelley's Case and the Doctrine of Worthier Title may be justified insofar as the
grantor lacks information about the problems caused in the absence of such legal rules); id. at 96-
97 (explaining why party with information affecting the value of a contract generally should not be
obliged to disclose it to the other party who does not have the information); id. at 99 (liability for
lies by seller in the sale of goods serves to reprieve buyer from engaging in inspections and informa-
tion acquisitions that are very costly); id. at 113-14 (justifying the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale on
consequential damages in that where one party has comparative advantage regarding magnitude
and significance of the risk, he/she is given an incentive to disclose risk or take other precautions
against the realization of the risk); id. at 115 (noting that Hadley v. Baxendale rule limiting contract
damages does not apply where what is unforseeable is the other party's lost profit).
72. Id. at 36-37 (explaining withholding of patent for fundamental ideas because it is too
difficult to identify the products in which they are embodied); id. at 71 (denying purchaser valid
title in stolen goods reduces incentives to steal and thereby reinforces system of legitimate entitle-
ments); id. at 80-81 (suggesting that one of the functions of contract law is to prevent opportunistic
behavior and minimize the costs of self-protective measures); id. at 82 (implied term of good faith
is part of every contract to prevent opportunistic uses of the sequential character of contractual
performance); id. at 86-87 (function of consideration in contract law is to distinguish legally
enforceable contracts from gratuitous promises, careless use of language, and opportunistic revi-
sions of original agreements); id. at 90 (noting that in the sale of goods involving mutual mistake,
the risk should generally be placed on the seller who can more cheaply acquire information about
his/her property at a lower cost than the buyer); id. at 103 (by making collection suits cheaper and
more certain, holder in due course provisions reduce the costs of concluding a contract and ob-
taining financing); id. at 116 (suggesting that penalty clauses in contracts can serve to communicate
reliability of promissor).
73. Id. at 40 (proposing an auction system for FCC radio licenses as more closely ap-
proximating willingness to pay); id. at 51 (method of calculation of just compensation under emi-
nent domain justified by difficulty of valuing subjective preferences of owners of condemned prop-
erty); id. at 64-65 (doctrine of waste to regulate relation of life tenant to remainderman avoids
problem of bilateral monopoly); id. at 84-85 (determination of whether some failure to carry
through on undertaking is a breach of contract depends upon whether liability will create incen-
tives for value-maximizing conduct in the future); id. at 88 (explanation for judicial refusal to
inquire into the adequacy of consideration); id. at 89-90 (whether the law should enforce promises
of rewards for lost goods to finders who did not know of the reward is not clear because it is
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negotiation costs 74
and so on.
Judge Posner's economic distillation of the law is no trivial accomplish-
ment. His chemistry inspires awe and wonder. Over and over again,
each bit of common law doctrine precipitates in the economic solutions.
This, of course, raises a question: just how did we get from the nihilism
of Coase to the fecundity of Posner?
Posner provides a few epistemological moves that deftly resolve
much that Coase had left open. Thus, Posner resolves the relation of
social value and private value in one swift move: social value is simply
defined to be the aggregate of private value.7 5 Next he offers some sim-
plifying (albeit rather paternalistic) definitional moves to limit the man-
ner in which private value choices can be made to count in the construc-
tion of legal rules. Posner tames the mischievous and unruly term
"value" by reducing it to mere "willingness to pay." 76 Willingness to
pay, in turn, is a technical term which can only be evidenced in some
very special ways. The best evidence of willingness to pay is to be found
in actual market transactions.7 7 Such evidence, of course, is not always
available, so the alternative approach is to try to guess whether, if a
transaction had been feasible, it would have occurred.78 These simplify-
difficult to perform a comparative valuation of the efforts of casual finders vs. active searchers); id.
at 117-18 (noting that specific performance serves as a substitute for damages where there are no
good market substitutes to permit easy valuation).
74. Id. at 46 (justifying English common law rule bestowing easement of light as against
adjacent, but not distant construction); id. at 46-47 (justifying attractive nuisance doctrine in re-
gard to child trespassers); id. at 68-69 (suggesting that Western water rights systems and FCC
licensing are structured to overcome negotiation costs among all the affected parties); id. at 82-83
(noting that in contractual relations, negotiation costs prevent rational parties from providing for
every contingency and that role of court is thus to approximate what would have been agreed upon
in the absence of these costs); id. at 90 (noting that mutual mistake doctrine in contract law serves
to overcome difficulties about negotiating over unforeseen eventualities); id. at 102 (standard form
contracts should be enforceable as they serve to minimize the transaction costs of negotiating and
drafting many separate agreements); id. at 122-23 (justifying implied contract doctrine where one
party bestows benefit on the other where prior negotiation was not possible but would have pro-
duced an agreement).
75. Thus despite Posner's caveats, it is clear that the third edition of his book retains
individual "willingness to pay" as the ultimate criterion for determining the efficiency of legal
rules. Posner suggests that efficiency denotes "that allocation of resources in which value is max-
imised"; value, in turn, "is measured by willingness to pay"; willingness to pay in turn, is evidence
by voluntary market transactions or conditions that seem to satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks concept. R.
PosNER, supra note 3, at 12-13. For explanation of the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency, see
supra note 35.
In the second edition of his book Posner had stated flat out: "'Efficiency' means exploiting
economic resources in such a way that 'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate con-
sumer willingness to pay for goods and services-is maximized." R. PosNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS
OF LAW at 10 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in original).
76. R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 11-12.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 14.
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ing moves help stabilize the volatile world opened up by Coase. And
they give content and meaning to the formulas and constructs set forth
above.7 9
It remains, of course, no mean trick to know which formula to use
when. And it's important to know since each of the formulas produce
very different reactions. But Posner knows. For the skeptics, some
questions linger. For instance, where transaction costs are significant,
do we approximate the outcomes a costless free market would have
produced or do we instead try to reduce the transaction costs? And then
too, how do we identify free riders, what they are riding on and how
much they would pay for the ride? And when is information acquisition
a cost of production, and when is it simply a transaction cost that can
sensibly be reduced by the grace of law? Or consider this: when do we
forbid agreements on the ground that third parties would be willing to
pay? How can we identify these third parties and determine what they
want and how much they are willing to pay? These are not questions for
a spare Sunday afternoon.
How does Posner know, for instance, whether a good would be
traded in the absence of transaction costs? The view from Chicago is
not clouded by the ying-yang skepticism of the West coast or perverted
by the nail-chewing self doubts of the Eastern seaboard: in Chicago,
one can safely appeal to common sense. One simply looks at who has
money to spend, and decides whether they have the inclination to spend
their money for that type of good. Just count up the "dollar/taste
votes." That's it! If some good is not traded, and common sense would
indicate that the dollar/taste votes would not purchase it, then it does
not matter that transaction costs are high. And where some good is
traded, the task of the law is to facilitate the market transaction, unless
of course there are some heavy dollar/taste votes out there who would
be willing to pay to forbid traffic in that particular good.
Ultimately, however, the power of Posner's alchemy dissolves in
his epistemological solutions. His depiction of various elements of the
common and constitutional law are little more than the relentless appli-
cation of the same formulas to an ever increasing sample of law data.
The plan is economic in form, but most of the work is done with the
epistemology of common sense and common law. And that raises some
problems. One problem is that both common sense and common law
are suspect sources of knowledge and thus provide only the weakest
sort of foundation for the definition of markets and the identification of
transaction costs.80 But even putting this problem aside, there remains
79. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
80. See Cohen, supra note 17, at 809-21 (criticizing the common sense use of spatial and
temporal metaphors to resolve legal problems as the reification of legal concepts).
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something askew in the epistemological structure of Posner's edifice.
On the one hand, common sense and common law are apparently good
enough to define actual and potential markets and to identify and assess
transaction costs. On the other hand, we must (for some reason) disre-
gard the common law and common sense intuitions that value does not
reduce to mere willingness to pay and that consumers are not always
rational maximizers of self-interest. What then is the epistemological
basis for recognizing the validity of common law and common sense in
one situation, but not the other?8 ' The short answer is that this is the
role of assumptions in theory.82 True enough, but what are we to do
with a body of formalized principles such as Posner's whose root as-
sumptions seem to contradict the very knowledges (common sense and
common law) that it deploys to produce conclusions? Even if this is not
cause for epistemological doubt, it does create a haunting sense of deja
vu. Posner's steady reliance on his formulas, his studied application of
the same technical patterns of transaction costs, and his abiding faith in
deductive reasoning are not wholly novel. Likewise, his brave denial of
the insights of other disciplines is something we have seen before.83 It's
all uncannily reminiscent of the architectural beauty of legal
formalism.84
Still, one can only make so much of the epistemological and aes-
thetic shortfalls of Judge Posner's approach. It might be that Posner's
efforts to explain ever more aspects of the law with his particular brand
of microeconomic theory could nevertheless be quite useful. The very
performance of this feat would demonstrate the consistency of
microeconomic thought with common law principles. As the number
81. The objection here is not to a lack of realism in the economist's assumptions, but
rather to the epistemological inconsistency in Posner's approach. He has not given us any criteria
(other than his assumptions) as to when it is permissible or not to look to the common law or
common sense as sources of knowledge. To put it simply: if you can look to the common law or
common sense for guidance some of the time, why can't you look there all of the time? The prob-
lem is not that there are no answers to this question. Rather, the problem is that the answers one
might give are probably not consonant with the rest of Posner's enterprise.
82. R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 15.
83.
The economic theory of law is the most promising positive theory of law extant. While
anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and other social scien-
tists besides economists also make positive analyses of the legal system, their work is thus
far insufficiently rich in theoretical or empirical content to afford serious competition to
the economists.
R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 24.
84. The legal formalists viewed law as a closed, self-sufficient, structured and deductive
system. See e.g., Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal
Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of our Dominant General Theory About Law and its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 861, 866-68 (1981) (describing the key features of legal formalism). But like
Posner, the legal formalists were compelled to complete and supplement their architectural vision
of law by incorporating the foreign (and ultimately dangerous) realm of common sense. See Co-
hen, supra note 17.
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and variety of legal rules explained in economic terms increases, the
credibility of economic theory as an explanation of law increases as
well. Indeed, this is one of the classic ways in which one vindicates a
theory: an attempt is made to show that the theory explains just about
everything under the sun.85 This exercise validates the power and ser-
viceability of the theory.
There is at least one situation, however, where this strategy (the
sort used by Posner) does not work very well.1 6 It arises where the the-
ory is composed of disparate and contradictory principles which cannot
be reconciled in the abstract. And this is precisely the state of Posner's
economic thought.8 7 In such cases, the trotting out of the theory to
account for ever more situations does not validate the theory in the
least-for the contradictions allow any event to be interpreted in terms
of the disparate categories. If you are not convinced, try explaining the
world in terms of (good and evil) or (phallic and vaginal) or (inside and
outside). (I guarantee success. I also guarantee that in terms of the intel-
lectual validation of the theory, the marginal returns on an additional
application are de minimis beyond, say, fifty pages or thirty
applications.)"8
The very irony of Posner's text is that although it purports to be an
explanation, it is in fact an interpretation of law. And as interpretation,
it falls into that class that we usually call translation.8 9
85. Posner believes that one test of theory is its explanatory power. R. POSNER, supra
note 3, at 16.
86. Another situation is one where our interest in knowledge is not to exercise power or
to control, but merely to understand. The traditional aesthetic criteria we use to assess theory (i.e.
coherence, elegance, integrity, sweep, etc.) may be irrelevant when we have no interest in using
theory to control or in using knowledge as power.
87. The formulas used by Posner to rationalize legal rules that are discussed above are
contradictory in the sense that each formula recommends a different solution. To be sure, they are
not contradictory if there is some stable and credible method for deciding which formula to use
when. But here we encounter a difficulty because Posner has not given us an account of his episte-
mology, his interpretive theory or his aesthetics. His work reveals that he tends to refer to the
common law and to common sense in large but widely varying doses to supply the missing ele-
ments. See supra notes 64-75. This unstable compound might be called Posner's hunches. See
Baker, The Ideology of Economic Analysis of Law, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 22-47 (1975) (noting
that Posner draws his hunches about the purposes of laws, from the laws themselves or common
sense); Leff, supra note 30, at 466 (pointing out that Posner can find a practice or rule inefficient
only by assuming that what society does and what it wants are different-yet he has furnished no
epistemological grounds for making such a judgment).
88. This is not to say that theories built upon contradiction are necessarily wrong. See
supra note 22. Nor does this mean that repeated application of such theories to new data is useless.
There are obviously lots of reasons and many of them good ones to continue the systematic appli-
cation of a theory built on contradiction over an entire field. It's just that intellectual validation of
the theory is not one of them.
89. See Leff, supra note 30, at 459 (dubbing Posner's approach "American Legal Nomi-
nalism" for its propensity to reduce explanation and interpretation to naming and defining.)
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V. IN DEFENSE OF COASE
I think that the author of The Problem of Social Cost9" should
bristle at Posner's uses of his insights. Posner's approach accomplishes
precisely what Coase warned us against. Posner approaches legal prob-
lems as if the goods and resources at stake were already defined and
given. In large part, though not consistently, Posner looks to the com-
mon law or common sense for a definition of what conflicting uses or
resources are at stake in a given area of law.91
Coase warned us against hypostatizing legal problems in this way.
He suggested that in developing an efficient regime, one had to examine
the effects of a proposed legal rule on all the affected activities.92 The
Coasian insight suggests that the establishment of any legal rule is likely
to raise transaction costs for the production and transfer of some good.
In a sense, this should seem obvious: even the establishment of a free
market in good X will raise transaction costs significantly for those who
would be willing to pay for the prohibition of a market in X. And it
does no good to say that these people have a "paternalist" interest not
worthy of consideration. Their interest is not paternalistic in the least:
they would be willing to pay to stop the traffic in good X. And what
they call their interest is probably good Y, something like an environ-
ment free of heroin, flesh peddling, hierarchy, institutional oppression
or whatever. 93
Thus, the Coasian approach requires the consideration of all possi-
ble markets that might be affected by the legal rule. This means that one
must be a bit more skeptical than Posner in describing markets and in
identifying which markets might be affected by a legal rule.94 All possi-
ble markets (including existing ones) are worth considering under the
Coasian approach. By contrast to the Posnerian view, Coase accords
no special privilege to those markets which the common law recognizes
90. Coase, supra note 1.
91. Much of Posner's explanations for the various common law doctrines borrow heav-
ily (albeit, selectively) from the "noneconomic" articulation of justifications often found in the
case law or in the exposition of the rules by traditional legal commentators. See supra notes 64-75.
But it is also true that many of his explanations borrow heavily from a common sense notion of
value. See Baker, supra note 87, at 22-47. The problem, of course, is that Posner has not offered
any criteria allowing us to choose between these two sources of knowledge when they conflict.
Likewise, he has also failed to provide us with any account of why these are more appropriate
sources of knowledge, than say, anthropology, sociology or psychology. Leff, supra note 30, at
469-77. And this is a serious problem: as Leff points out the only way Posner can criticize a legal
rule as inefficient is to assume that it is aimed at achieving something other than what it actually
achieves. Posner has not given an account of how he (or anyone else) can, within his framework,
know that what is desired is something other than what is achieved. Left, supra note 30, at 466.
92. See supra text accompanying note 1. See infra note 160.
93. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
94. See Baker, supra note 87, at 22-47.
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in its principles.95 On the contrary, to the extent that the common law
embraces a crude non-reciprocal conception of causation it should be
suspect as source for the definition of goods, activities and markets.96
Coase likewise refrained from offering up common sense as an episte-
mological basis for economic reasoning.
He thought it crucial that one examine the likely effects of any pro-
posed change in the legal order. And in stark contrast to the popular
right-wing lawyer-economists, he conceived the relation of law to the
allocation of resources in a dialectical manner. A change in the specific
content of a legal rule could, according to Coase, be expected to yield
changes not only with respect to the matters covered by the rule, but
also with respect to matters extrinsic to the purported operation of the
rule. Thus, if accompanied by significant transaction costs, a rule about
the liability of trains for failure to monitor spark emissions could be
expected to alter not only the frequency of railway service, but also the
rate of conversion of land to combustible crops, and even the rate of
substitute forms of transportation. Against the background of the dia-
lectical approach offered by Coase, the formulaic crystallization of his
thought launched by the right-wing lawyer-economists seems volunta-
ristic-a political move.
VI. RECLAIMING COASE: AN ESSAY IN RETRIEVAL.
It is, of course, no secret that the Coasian insights have largely
been appropriated by the right-wing lawyer-economists. It is also not a
secret why this should have happened. Coase, after all, is a Chicago
School economist.97 And his article can be read (though it is an impov-
erished reading) as a having an intrinsic right-wing tilt. 9' It does have a
right-wing tilt, but the tilt is not intrinsic to Coase's arguments or to his
insights.
95. As Coase states:
The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights will often seem strange
to an economist because many of the factors on which the decision turns are, to an
economist irrelevant. Because of this, situations which are, from an economic point of
view, identical will be treated quite differently by the courts.
Coase, supra note 1 at 15. Coase was somewhat ambivalent about how well the common law
understood the economic implications of its decisions. See supra notes 15, 20.
96. See supra notes 15, 20.
97. See Priest, supra note 57, at 1635 (noting Coase's hostility to the activist state and
governmental regulation).
98. See Coase, supra note I, at 18 (suggesting that economists and policy-makers over-
estimate the advantages of government regulation).
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Coase set out to attack the wrong-headed Pigovian thinking that
lent support to government intervention and regulation of markets.99
In attacking the Pigovian tradition, Coase also questioned the wisdom
of the governmental policies it produced. In contrast to the right-wing
lawyer-economists, however, Coase did not conclude that because
Pigovian thinking was wrong and led to government regulation that
government regulation was necessarily wrong-headed also.' ° ° Coase's
thought was far too sophisticated to lapse into this error. And his arti-
cle carefully maintains a theoretical ambivalence about the appropriate
uses, not only of government intervention, but also of market mecha-
nisms and market bypass mechanisms such as the firm.' 1 As Priest
notes:
Coase's message is ultimately nihilistic. After presenting re-
peated examples in which attempts to correct market failures
only further reduce social welfare, Coase concludes that eco-
nomics provides no guide whatever to social policy. "As
Frank H. Knight has so often emphasized," Coase an-
nounces, "problems of welfare economics must ultimately dis-
solve into a study of aesthetics and morals."'
10 2
This is certainly not the way the right-wing read Coase. But if Priest's
reading of Coase is correct, then why were Coase's insights left to the
right?
99. See Kitch, supra note 5, at 220-22 (recounting the genesis of The Problem of Social
Cost and Coase's initial triumph over Pigovian thought in a seminar at Chicago). See also, supra
note 36.
100. It would be difficult (putting it mildly) to characterize Coase as an active supporter of
the welfare state. Indeed, much of Coase's other work both before and after the 1960 article, The
Problem of Social Cost, was aimed at criticizing government regulation of markets. See, e.g., R. H.
COASE, BRITISH BROADCASTING, A STUDY IN MONOPOLY (1950); Coase, The Choice of the Institu-
tional Framework: A Comment, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 493 (1974). See also, Priest, supra note 57 at
1635 (noting that Coase was no friend of the activist state). For a recent compilation of Coase's
works, see Landes, Carlton & Easterbrook, On the Resignation of Ronald Coase, 26 J. LAW &
ECON. iii (1983).
Coase is a Chicago School economist, but the significance and implications of his article are
hardly confined to that particular school. It would be a mistake to overlook the extent to which
political commitments influence intellectual production. But I think it would be equally a mistake
to conceive the relation between the two as one of simple cause and effect or even in terms of a
perfect correspondence.
101. As Coase states,
From these considerations, it follows that direct governmental regulation will not neces-
sarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm.
But equally there is no reason, why, on occasion such governmental administrative regu-
lation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency.
Coase, supra note 1, at 18. See generally, id. at 15-18 discussing the comparative advantages of
firm, market and government mechanisms in terms of efficiency.
102. Priest, supra note 57, at 1635 (citing Coase, supra note 1, at 43).
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There is a certain degree of symbolism surrounding the political
conduct of legal discourse. The unfortunate (though probably unavoid-
able) result is that useful or creative ideas are often dismissed because
they emanate from a "politically incorrect source." ' This tendency
may have affected the treatment of Coase's article.
In any event, it is hardly surprising that the liberal center and the
left did not extend a gleeful welcome for Coase's article. The language
of microeconomics generally presumes much that the left would like to
question. 10 4 And so for the left, Coase's article was often classed with
the other law and economics apologists who were to be either chal-
lenged or ignored.'o 5 As for the liberal center, it had no need of Coase.
From the perspective of the liberal center, the positive law of the 60's
and the early 70's was just fine (or close to it). '0 6 Microeconomics was
simply superfluous to the center liberal project. When the liberals even-
tually awoke to see the havoc wrought by the right-wing lawyer-econo-
mists, they largely abandoned law and economics and attempted to re-
taliate with scholarship in law and .... (anything but economics).1 0 7
103. And correspondingly, wrong-headed ideas are accepted (or at least gain currency)
when they are offered by "politically correct" or "institutionally sanctioned" sources. See Fish,
Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 645 (1986).
104. For instance, market definitions of value seem to skew the production and distribu-
tion of goods to favor the rich rather than the poor and tend to favor production activities as
opposed to consuming activities. Baker, The Ideology of Economic Analysis of Law, 5 J. PHIL. &
PuB. An'. 3 (1975). There are also questions about the origins of individual tastes and desires along
with doubts about the uncritical servicing of these tastes and desires via market mechanisms. Hel-
ler, The Importance of Normative Decisionmaking: The Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis
for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976
Wis. L. REV. 385. There are also some questions about the validity and reach of the neoclassical
assumption that consumers make "rational" choices. Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L.
REV. 769. And there are questions about how legal rules and regimes affect consumer tastes and
preferences. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979). Another problem is that law and economics prescriptions depend
upon controversial descriptions of initial entitlements. Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis
of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 939 (1980); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: a
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). These types of inquiries and problems are typically excluded
from the practice of law and economics scholarship.
105. Obviously, it is difficult to cite examples of neglect of Coase by the left. But it is not
difficult to cite leftist challenges of Coase. Indeed, much of the recent literature of CLS targeting
law and economics places Coase within its sights. See, e.g., Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science
or Politics? 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 907-09 (1981); Kelman, Consumption Theory, supra note 104.
106. See Fiss, The Death of Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1986). As Horwitz puts it,
"the boldest stroke in Coase's article was to deny the interventionist premises of welfare economics
at just the moment it had achieved hegemony." Horwitz, supra note 105, at 907. There was, of
course, some lag time in the transmission of Coase's message throughout the legal academy. And
the liberals did not receive the bad news about Pigou's fate until some time later.
107. According to Horwitz, an alternative approach used by the liberals was to expand
the concept of transaction costs, find them everywhere and thereby justify intervention. Horwitz,
supra note 105, at 908. See Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1107-
13 (1983) (provocative attempt to coopt the Coasean paradigm to the liberal cause).
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But for the right, the Coase article was a godsend.1" 8 From the
right's perspective, Coase's insights warranted both a special hostility
towards government regulation as well as the elevation of the market to
the status of a Platonic form.'0 9 Here finally was the Archimedean
point from which to launch attacks on the paternalism of the welfare
state and its senseless over-regulation of everything-well, not quite
everything, but everything that shouldn't be regulated-you know.
There is a point to this qualification. The beauty of Coase's insight
(for the right) is that the theory allowed a radical questioning of both
paternalistic regulation and the liberal attempts at wealth redistribution
without, however, lapsing into the sort of self-defeating naturalistic
laissez-faire approach that the right had championed unsuccessfully in
earlier eras.'1 0 The Coasian approach left a powerful interventionist
role for the law to play: the facilitation of market transactions. Indeed,
there is some irony in the fact that law and economics theory has been
attacked for its highly individualistic, non-interventionistic character
and for its disregard of community values."'
108. Witness the excitement of the neoclassical economists at the emergence of Coase's
article. Kitch, supra note 5, at 220-21.
109. The "market" is the lawyer-economist's main ideal and major metaphor. Voluntary
market transactions are generally presumed to be the most efficient. See supra note 53. Other forms
of allocation such as the various modes of government allocation or the various types of firms are
justified to the extent that they facilitate operation of the market or to the extent that they approxi-
mate the idea of the market better than an actual market would. See supra notes 45, 54, 55. There
is, of course, a serious problem with this exaltation of the market as the ideal: the market is costly
to operate. Veljanovski, The Coase Theorem and the Economic Theory of Markets, supra note 33, at
69. See infra text accompanying notes 125-32.
These costs become more visible when we realize that there is virtually no human behavior
which can escape the reach of the market metaphor. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 127-30
(describing the economics of the nuclear family and suggesting that love is a form of altruism
which "facilitates cooperation; it is a cheap and efficacious substitute for (formal) contracting." Id.
at 129). Love means never having to say you're sorry? (This cuts both ways.)
110. See Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. Rav. 939 and particularly notes 20-25 (1985). Kennedy notes that the
classical economists sought to limit state intervention in economic life beyond the definition and
protection of labor inputs and the system of free exchange by invoking the values of freedom,
justice, and naturalness. The political/legal implications of the classical view are familiar enough:
The basic message of the whole was very simple: there were laws of economic life, analo-
gous to the physical laws of nature; the natural operation of those laws brought about
just outcomes; most of the proposals of social reformers involved coercive modifications
of those outcomes and could only work if economic laws were somehow suspended. So
long as they continued in operation, the egalitarian impulse to redistribute wealth by
manipulating the legal system inevitably involved both injustice and a counterproductive
reduction in total wealth.
Id. at 958.
111. There is irony, but there is also some truth to the charge. First, the truth: right-wing
microeconomic thought tends to premise its analysis on the supposition that all valued experiences
take (or at least can take) a commodity form. Kennedy, supra note 110, at 960-61. In turn, this
supposition leads to a devaluation and underproduction of communal goods that are (almost by
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That sort of attack could work well enough against the rhetoric of
Spencer's Social Statics, or Justice Peckham's opinion in Lochner v.
New York or the work product of the classical right-wing economic lu-
minaries. 112 But as against the modem right-wing economic thinkers,
this sort of attack has become a shadow passing by its own ship in the
night. What the right has done with Coasian insights is transform them
into a powerful vehicle and justification for selective government inter-
vention. The notion of transaction cost, for instance, is used quite often
to justify judicial approximations of the bargain that the parties would
have reached in the absence of transaction costs. 113 Indeed, the concept
of transaction costs is a powerful interventionist tool as Bruce Acker-
man, a prominent liberal scholar, has recently noted.' And the right-
wing economic thinkers molded this tool to their vision of community:
it is not a ruggedly individualistic culture they worship, but a stream-
lined capitalistic machine where the state plays an active role in creat-
ing, repairing and improving production for market. " 5 It is a commu-
nity where the only relevant indicium of human satisfaction is
willingness to pay. " 16 And, of course limiting the individual's input into
the development of collective rules to such a grudgingly narrow channel
as willingness to pay hardly seems to be a celebration of individualism.
It seems rather, well ... paternalistic. " '
In short, the right's appropriation of Coase's insights is no sur-
prise. Nor is it surprising that his insights were freeze-dried into some
serviceable prescriptions and presumptions to govern the production of
legal rules. This simplification is not only conducive to the right's politi-
cal program, but it is a normal outgrowth of the political constraints on
scholarly production in law. The sort of nominalistic and anti-dialecti-
definition) not subject to private appropriation: love, meaningful work, a sense of purpose, collec-
tive aesthetics, etc. Id. at 972.
Now for the irony: right-wing microeconomics has a fairly well developed sense of the ideal
community: it is one where the state intervenes frequently to facilitate market transactions or to
replicate the transactions that would occur if a free market were possible. See authorities cited in
supra notes 54-56, 66-74.
112. For discussion of the classical economic theories and their relation to legal thought,
see Kennedy, supra note 110, at 939-58.
113. See supra note I11.
114. B. ACKERMAN, RE oNsTRuCTING AMERICAN LAW (1985). See also Ackerman, supra
note 107, at 1099-1114 (1983).
115. See supra notes 54-56, 66-74, 111.
116. See supra note 75.
117. And indeed, PosrfaR's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986) is far from a cele-
bration of individual freedom. Rather it is a sustained tribute to paternalism. The paternalistic
moment in the lawyer-economist's moves is difficult to uncover because it occurs very early in the
enterprise: it is the initial claim that the only valid indicium of human satisfaction is "willingness to
pay." This initial step serves as a formal constraint on how desires and needs can be expressed to
influence the construction of the legal and political order. And as formal constraints go, this one is
highly paternalistic. See generally notes 66-74.
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cal approach propounded by Posner, for instance, can be understood in
part as a lawyer's effort to transform scholarship into authority.1 1 8
This tendency is common to legal academics of virtually every political
stripe. For theories to rise to the level of authority (in our legal culture)
they must be relatively unequivocal; they must yield clear implications
and serviceable prescriptions; and they must present a unified, coherent
and consistent front. It is thus no surprise that in the canonization of
theory to authority, legal academics routinely attempt to strip the theo-
ries of ambiguity, uncertainty, subtlety, and contradiction. What we get
out of the process are unstable authorities and questionable theory.
Even if none of this is suprising, it seems nonetheless unfortunate
that Coase's article has become more or less the exclusive property of
the right-wing lawyer-economists. 1 19 For there is nothing essentially
right-wing in The Problem of Social Cost. On the contrary, the insight
into the reciprocal nature of harm in conflicting resource use, is a pow-
erful tool for disestablishing the privileges accorded to certain select
activities by the law. It offers the possibility of questioning and examin-
ing the value preferences ensconced in legal doctrines. It also reminds us
that we are responsible for making these choices and that we cannot
avoid this responsibility by deferring to the natural order of things.
Coase depicts our world as one of continual and systemic interfer-
ence. He thus removes the illusion of a reconciliation of conflict so
tempting to legal academics who seem bent on dissolving contradiction
in syntheses that deny the continued presence of interference and con-
flict. His reciprocal view of causation implies that any solution (legal or
otherwise) has a cost and that the notion of legal harmony or synthesis
is illusory.
There is something radical and dialectical in this view: Coase's in-
sight not only destabilizes the received wisdom of the common law and
its conventional moral and aesthetic architecture, but it puts us on
guard against thinking that a new architecture would somehow solve
our problems. t 2 0 Coase's description of the reciprocal nature of harm
demands that we continue to question the modus vivendi adopted to
118. For a discussion of the sort of market failure this cartel among lawyers, judges and
academics can produce, see Schlag, The Brilliant, The Curious and The Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV.-
(forthcoming 1987).
119. Theoretical attempts to reclaim Coase from the right wing are relatively rare and
have occurred later rather than sooner. Ackerman's book, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW,
supra note 114, and the parent article, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, supra note 107 at 1107-
13 are provocative attempts to coopt Coase to the liberal cause. The fact that these two attempts
are rare and provocative is revealing given that Ackerman's article comes some 23 years after the
publication of The Problem of Social Cost. Coase, supra note I. But see Horwitz, supra note 105
(suggesting that liberals routinely expand the concept of transactions costs). For equally late at-
tempts to reclaim Coase from the right, see infra note 126.
120. In contemporary terms, the Coasian perspective might be described as "anti-founda-
tionalist". See T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 127-50 (1983) (discussing poststructuralism).
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adjudicate the competing claims of rival activities. It systematically
draws attention to what we may have lost, given up and overlooked in
adopting a particular legal rule or legal regime. I think these Coasian
insights point left.
The same could be said of Coase's injunction that we examine the
consequences of any legal rule not just in terms of the matters covered
by the legal rule, but on the background of associated activities as well.
More important, we have to consider the consequences of the legal rule
not just in terms of the background activities as they were initially de-
scribed, but in terms of the background activities as they have been al-
tered by adoption of the rule.
This admonition warns us against the fatly reified analytical mode
of thought inculcated so forcefully (and very often successfully) in the
first year of law school. In that mode of thinking, the professor's typical
question about what the legal rule should be is presented against a fixed
and frozen background of related legal rules. The inquiry then proceeds
by examining the implication of various possibilities against this back-
ground. Next there is the demonstration that adoption of any legal rule
would alter the fixed and frozen background surrounding the subject
matter of the rule. And perhaps the point is made that adoption of the
rule would change the character of the problem as it was initially posed.
But rarely is it made clear that the wisdom (if any) of the proposed legal
rule is to be ascertained against the dynamic background which the pro-
posed rule has just defrosted. Coase exposes the weakness of failing to
make this last move and ultimately impeaches the conventional analytic
mode in favor of a more dialectical vision of law. Proposed rule changes
not only affect the background conditions of the problem, but affect the
depiction of the problem as it was initially posed. And it is in terms of
this changed depiction that the wisdom of the proposed rule must be
ascertained.
What Coase offers here is nothing short of a view of law as dis-
placement. Legal rules not only displace the problems they are designed
to resolve, but they displace the very context or background which gives
rise to the problem in the first place. Coase invites us to look at the
effect of legal rules on the totality and to avoid freezing the totality in
thought or deed. Here too Coase's thought points left.
It is not just the general methodology Coase employs that is useful
to a radical understanding of law, but his treatment of specific substan-
tive concepts. For instance, the Coasian attack on the Pigovian tradi-
tion is an assault on the reification of the social product. The substan-
tive implications of Coase's treatment of Pigou call for a radical
reexamination of possible visions of the social product under alterna-
tive regimes. Coase concludes his devastation of the Pigovian compari-
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son of private and social cost by noting that: "The belief that it is desir-
able that the business which causes harmful effects should be forced to
compensate those who suffer damage.... is undoubtedly the result of
not comparing the total product obtainable with alternative social ar-
rangements." 1 21 According to Coase, the social product obtainable
under various regimes must be assessed in totality. 12 2 What is more, the
social product associated with a particular legal rule is not something
that can be assessed merely by comparing the private product of pro-
duction with the value of the product and its externalities (i.e. the social
product). Rather a legal rule imposing significant transaction costs
must be seen as having an effect not just on the activity which it regu-
lates, but also on conflicting, substitute, and associated activities as
well. If this is correct, then the concept of social product cannot be
defined or explored intelligently merely by positing idealized conditions
in the market in question.
Coase illustrates this point with a simple traffic example. A motor-
ist late at night stops for a red light even though there is no risk of
accident. He does so because of the in terrorem effect of traffic fines. If
he ran the red light, the total product would increase because he would
save time without increasing anyone's costs. Coase points out that we
can hardly conclude from this particular market situation that the so-
cial product would increase if we eliminated traffic fines.1 23 Yet this is
precisely the sort of reasoning that the Pigovian comparison of private
cost to social cost encourages. As Coase explains,
The comparison of private and social products is neither here
nor there.... The Pigovian analysis shows us that it is possi-
ble to conceive of better worlds than the one in which we live.
But the problem is to devise practical arrangements which will
correct defects in one part of the system without causing more
serious harm in other parts.1 24
Coase thus suggests that by projecting an idealized vision of the market
under scrutiny, the Pigovian tradition offers a frozen and rather unreal-
istic conception of social product. In turn, deployment of this concep-
tion of the social product for fashioning legal rules is likely to produce
deleterious effects in other markets. Coase invites us instead to develop
alternative visions of the social product based upon an examination in
total of all the markets likely to be affected by a proposed rule. This
approach, of course, radicalizes the definition and exploration of social
product by casting it free from the identification of the specific market
121. Coase, supra note 1, at 40.
122. See supra note 20.
123. Coase, supra note 1, at 34.
124. Id. at 34.
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governed by the legal rule. The approach thus focuses attention and
inquiry upon the identification and description of the markets affected
by the rule. No longer can the relevant markets be defined by the con-
tent of the proposed rule. And no longer can the social product be iden-
tified by a formalistic projection of the markets identified by the content
of the legal rule to their idealized conditions. Coase wanted us to see
things whole. And he was quite careful to avoid formalistic and mech-
anistic constructions of the whole. On the contrary, he invited us to
examine alternative possible wholes. I think this is an invitation that the
left can readily accept.
Even the Coasian conception of transaction costs has a radical
edge. Once we are freed from the Pigovian formalism (the equation of
relevant markets with rule content and the construction of social prod-
uct by idealizing relevant markets) the concept of transaction costs pro-
vides a powerful tool to examine critically any regime. In marked con-
trast to what the right would like us to believe, it does not at all follow
from Coase's article that the preferable legal regime is the one which
creates the lowest transaction costs. Nor does it inevitably follow that
such a regime can be equated with the "free market."
In fact the author of The Problem of Social Cost should disagree
with these nuggets of right-wing wisdom. The concepts of reciprocal
causation and feedback loop, together with the Coasian defrosting of
the concept of social product argue powerfully against the right's inter-
pretation. In the Coasian world, the idea of a regime which creates low
transaction costs is most often a non-sequitur: the reciprocal nature of
harm conception suggests as much. 1 25 Indeed, the establishment of ini-
tial entitlements in good X together with the right of free market ex-
change for good X will in all likelihood create significant transaction
costs for the market in good Y. Good Y here would be some good
which can only be appropriated or protected when good X is not freely
traded. If good X can be freely traded, then the persons desiring good Y
will have to pay those who consume or produce good X to cease from
doing so. If the costs of identifying actual (and potential) traders in
good X are significant, if individual contracts have to be established
and enforced, the transaction costs for those who want to trade in good
Y are likely to be significant. Let me describe some right-wing visions of
what good X and Y might look like:
125. See supra note 15-29. See infra note 161.
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FREE TRADE IN RAISES TRANSACTION COSTS IN
GOOD X GOOD Y
obscenity moral culture
homosexual conduct God fearing living
dissident speech patriotic exaltation
sex the family
abortion the sanctity of human life
It is, of course, quite possible to give a left-wing schematic of good X
and good Y:
FREE TRADE IN RAISES TRANSACTION COSTS IN
GOOD X GOOD Y
commodities meaningful work
labor self-realization
development of markets non-alienated relations
bureaucratic expertise self-determination 126
Now, of course, an afficionado of right-wing law and economics would
likely respond to this second chart with the observation that "There is
simply no evidence that persons are precluded by transaction costs
from producing or purchasing goods such as meaningful work or self-
realization, or self-determination etc." 127 But this response is wide of
the mark. There can be no serious question that from a left perspective,
"free trade" in labor and commodities impedes both meaningful work
and self-realization. 2 Ultimately then, the right's response depends
upon some notion that whatever obstacles preclude the production of
such values do not count as transactions costs.
To illustrate the point, suppose, as is generally the case, that as-
sembly line workers (in the steel mill or in the law school) do not or
cannot pay their employers a sufficient premium to deroutinize produc-
tion and make it more meaningful. Perhaps the workers have not
thought of the idea, or they think it likely to fail or perhaps they simply
126. For earlier explorations of this type of schema, see Boyle, The Politics of Reason:
Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 699 (1985) (citing Duncan
Kennedy). Peller, Book Review: The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872-73 &
n.13 (1985); Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv.
671, 678-80 (1983).
127. I have only heard this response in faculty lounge conversation, but it seems quite
plausible given the preference of right-wing microeconomists for market registered transactions.
See supra note 53.
Horwitz, for instance, suggests that what distinguishes liberal from conservative law and
economics is that the former are inclined to find transaction costs everywhere, whereas the latter
are instead inclined to deny them and thereby preserve the sanctity of market regimes. Horwitz,
supra note 105, at 908.
128. See Kennedy, supra note 110 at 972. K. MARX, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC
MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 106-19 (Int. Pub. 1971) (discussing the structure of alienation associated
with the commodity production process).
An Appreciative Comment on Coase
have not developed a taste for meaningful work. Who knows? The
question that confronts us then is how to interpret the workers' failure
to pay something in return for more rewarding work.
There are two explanations which I want to consider. The right-
wing lawyer-economist would probably interpret the workers' inaction
as signifying an absence of market demand for non-boring work. The
Coasian perspective, however, might provide insights for a more left
leaning interpretation. It might be that the lack of any indication of
demand for non-boring work is a function of the transaction costs
which inhibit the creation of such a market. 29 Indeed, once we recog-
nize that the creation of a market economy (free labor and commodity
exchange) affects taste, cognition, and the availability of information,
we must recognize that these effects can become transaction costs pre-
cluding the creation and production of certain values. There is a feed-
back loop here which the Coasian approach suggests we ought to
examine.
Nor can we, as the right-wing lawyer-economists are wont to do,
elide this inquiry with the supposition that human beings are rational
actors who act to maximize their self interest." 0 This supposition may
or may not be true, but even if it is true, human beings are only rational
within the context of the personality and ideological development that
they have experienced. Once we see human rationality, not just as an
origin, but also as something that is produced (sometimes rather coer-
cively), the right-wing lawyer-economist's radical supposition of ration-
ality loses much of its value. 3 ' If we are serious about following
129. The structure of the argument is borrowed from the right-wing economists: 1) The
good is not traded on the market. 2) We have reason to believe that this good is highly valued. 3)
Therefore, the inference arises that transaction costs preclude the existence of the market for that
good.
130. As assumptions go, this one really flies. The right-wing law and economics scholars
can deduce most of the world with this one. Demsetz put it this way:
Although they [Coase & Director] seem to be different and to address different problems,
there was a common theme, and that was to assume that people try to maximize and that
really there is competition in the attempt to maximize, and to use those working assump-
tions to try to explain a lot of things, like why you have firms, why you have particular
pricing practices. All the conclusions derive from the attempt of maximizers to overcome
certain kinds of costs impediments to maximizing which we now subsume under the
name of transaction costs. These things become readily explainable-readily, that is,
looking backward-if you take those two assumptions and keep pushing them.
Kitch, supra note 5, at 104 (comments of Harold Demsetz). See also R. Posra, THE ECONoMIcs OF
JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 146-227 (discussing the economy of primitive societies on the basis of
rational adjustment of behavior in light of costs and scarcity). Demsetz, Towards a Theory of
Property Rights, supra note 55, at 351-53 (interpreting the emergence of property regimes as ra-
tional adjustment to scarcity). I think there is little doubt that the right-wing microeconomists
lived in Paris in a prior life.
131. It loses value both as a descriptive and normative matter. With the former, the as-
sumption loses value because any behavior no matter how stupid, self-loathing or destructive can
be found rational. And that suffices to clinch the normative bankruptcy of the assumption and its
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Coase's insights, we should examine the various types of rationality
available under alternative social arrangements.' 32 In the next section,
I propose to draw out the implications of this suggestion by examining
the implications of Coase's insights for the construction of normative
legal theory.
One of the implications is to retrieve the subject of production as
germane to normative theory. This alone would entail a change in di-
rection for the bulk of contemporary normative legal theory. Norma-
tive theory in law typically focuses on problems of distribution and on
the correction of invasions of distributional entitlements.' 33 Produc-
tion is almost invariably treated by the legal moralists as a derivative
(albeit limiting) concern. The economists, by and large, do the opposite:
production is their field and the concepts of distribution and correction
are treated as derivative (but again limiting concerns). ' 34 I think that
productions. We have no reason to be attracted to efficiency as a value if that concept is the max-
imization of behavior that includes stupidity, self-loathing or self-destruction.
This use of the term "rationality" by the law and economics scholars is what I call an "idio-
syncratic definition." See P. SCHLAG & D. SKOVER, TACTICS OF LEGAL REASONING 14 (1986) (the
words used borrow on the moral or political charge of the terms, while committing us to a peculiar
definition). The right-wing microeconomist defines rationality (and, by the way, efficiency as well)
in highly technical ways that depart significantly from the moral baggage we bring to these terms.
132. And Coase has come quite close to suggesting the same thing himself:
[There is one respect in which I hold a heretical view. Most economists make the as-
sumption that man is a rational utility maximiser. This seems to me both unnecessary
and misleading. I have said that in modem institutional economics we should start with
real institutions. Let us also start with man as he is. I am not calling into question that
more is demanded if something becomes easier to get or that more will be supplied if the
price is raised. But what is being maximised? Some of my colleagues quote a statement of
Bentham's to the effect madmen also calculate. This is a correct and, I believe, a very
important statement. But I would stop there. I do not think that we should draw the
conclusion that madmen are also rational.
Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFr
229, 231 (1984).
133. Thus, for instance, the major contemporary works of normative theory popular in
legal circles frame the problem of social justice in distributional terms. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973); R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) And when speaking
of social justice, we are prone to thinking of that concept in terms of "distributive justice."
I think there is an unreflective ideological tilt in framing the question this way: the concep-
tion of social justice in distributive terms mirrors the commodity form for the production of value.
Human goods are conceived as discrete entities (rights, privileges, opportunities, etc.), which are
held as property, can be capitalized and transferred.
134. Thus, a typical caveat in the microeconomic literature is that the distributional ef-
fects of legal rules may have some efficiency effects in some circumstances. See, e.g., R. POSNER,
supra note 3, at 15. Another typical caveat in the microeconomic literature is that efficiency analy-
sis is not exhaustive of social virtue and that there are other considerations such as distributive
concerns, and "moralisms" that may have to be taken into account in fashioning legal rules. See,
e.g., Calabresi, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1113-14 (1972); A. M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
7-10 (1983). There are, of course, a number of microeconomic scholars who suggest that distribu-
tional concerns are resolved as a matter of historical actuality or normative appeal or both in terms
of efficiency. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 48-118 (equating justice with
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much could be gained on the normative side if instead of conceiving of
normative legal theory in terms of the metaphors of distribution and
correction, we framed the problem more broadly to include human pro-
duction: just how should we produce ourselves?
VII. EXTENDING THE COASIAN INSIGHTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NORMATIVE THEORY.
It may seem odd to think of rationality or conceptualization as an
economic good. Yet if economic theory is capable of encompassing all
social values (as economists are fond of reminding us) then conscious-
ness and rationality cannot be banished from the reach of econom-
ics. 35 I think Coase offers some criteria for evaluating the production
of consciousness and rationality. By way of example, I will focus on the
implications of the Coasian insights on the production of normative
theories about law.
First, Coase's insight into the reciprocity of harm provides a cri-
tique of the classic approach to normative theory. The classic approach
(much like the Pigovian tradition) typically sections off some part of the
legal universe (such as distributive justice, the obligation to obey law,
etc.) and then attempts to optimize conditions in that particular mar-
ket. '36 Following again in the tracks of the Pigovian tradition, the clas-
sic approach to normative scholarship extends virtually no considera-
tion for how the reorganization of the section under inquiry will alter
the excluded and frozen background. Coase's feedback loop, of course,
suggests that this is a dangerous oversight. Indeed, the feedback loop
suggests that the advancement of any social value is quite likely to alter
the background conditions which made that social value attractive in
the first place. Legal scholarship is full of examples of commitments to
optimize a particular social value in a particular market with the result
that background conditions are so altered that the social value loses
some of its initial appeal. A number of ironic twists can be noted here:
efficiency). See also, R. PosNER, supra note 3, at 25-26 (suggesting that efficiency is not exhaustive
of the concept ofjustice). For a rare law and economics piece which places distributional concerns
at the center of inquiry see, Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can
Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them? 69 IOWA L. Ray. 833 (1984) (analyzing
the distributional impact of various tort liability regimes). Calabresi notes that many of the practi-
tioners of law and economics claim that because nothing scientific can be said about the distribu-
tion of initial entitlements or distributional values, these must be ignored. Id. at 833-34.
135. See supra note 51.
136. For a brief discussion of this problem see Schlag, supra note 118.
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the attempt to humanize through contextualization t3  .
can be expected to yield a degeneration of law into bureaucracy
and an expansion of the latter as it comes to encompass the full
richness of human relations.'
13
the view that distributive justice is the first virtue of social institu-
tions 39 ..
can be expected to create deficiencies and dislocations in the way
we produce ourselves as human beings and to ultimately compli-
cate the problem of distributive justice. 140
137. Contextualization seems to have much appeal in a number of politically diverse
academic constituencies. The Liberal Center: See Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way:
An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TExAs L. REv. 1307-38 (1979) (CLS
Scholar suggesting that just about every other article on constitutional law adopts a flexible bal-
ancing test to be applied as appropriate in the circumstances). See also, Tushnet, Anti-Formalism
in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502 (1985) (discussing the embrace by political
liberals of the antiformalist style). Critical Legal Studies: Kennedy, supra note 22 (ultimately prais-
ing the flexible contextualist standard as against the predictable and certain rule); Gabel & Harris,
Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, II N.Y.U.
RE. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83) (praising contextualization). Feminist Jurisprudence: Scales,
The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986) (suggesting that the
method of feminism is consciousness raising and equating the personal with the political). The
moves towards contextualization in legal scholarship are inspired? supported? or ratified? by some
broader scale works currently in fashion. C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983) (Advocating the
virtues of "thick description"); M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 87-140 (1980) (questioning the
relation of truth and power, suggesting that their relation is a local one and advocating the avoid-
ance of totalizing systems of thought); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (differentiating
male and female ethics by likening the former as given to abstraction and the latter as in touch with
the concrete).
The political implications ofcontextualization are far from clear. To an extent it can be seen
as the well-advised strategic retreat of reason designed to preserve some jurisdiction for humane
approaches to life and thought in the postmodernist world. It can also be seen as a renunciation of
the attempt to use knowledge as power or theory as a control device. See supra note 86. Such a
renunciation of power in favor of understanding is attractive, but it does present some problems.
Contextualization is not immune from the charge of formalism. See P. SCHLAG, supra note 22. And
contextualization could easily lead to (and rationalize) the bureaucratic management of all sectors
of life by the empirical experts.
138. And it can also be expected to defer to contextual extra-legal norms such as conven-
tion, custom, common sense or the what-goes-without-saying. See P. Schlag, supra note 22, at 410-
II (suggesting that standard context-oriented regimes are likely to defer to external norms).
139. This statement is taken from J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTIcE 3 (1973). Rawls sug-
gested that justice was the first virtue in the sense that it is the sine qua non of social institutions-
the value which requires realization first in a moral sense. In legal circles, there is not much compe-
tition for this honored spot. Utility, efficiency and some coarse concept of effectiveness seem to be
the recognized prime contenders.
140. The view that justice is the first virtue of social institutions tends to emphasize the
way in which goods are distributed among the various participants. Such a view systematically
deemphasizes inquiry about what should be produced, by whom and how. In turn, the failure to
consider these questions (in theory and in fact) leads to or reinforces the valuation of goods as
commodities and exacerbates controversies over the distribution of rights, opportunities and
wealth. In commodity production regimes, law is often a zero-sum game-and questions about the
nature of justice become increasingly controversial.
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the glorification of individual rights in constitutional jurispru-
dence 4  ...
can be expected to lead to an impoverishment of the community
and communal values and thus to undermine the shared cultural
commitments that support individual rights. 1
42
Countless other ironic twists in the positions taken in the legal literature
could be cited. 143 I don't think any one is immune from this problem.
But I do think that the Coasian feedback loop is an important con-
tribution to the development of an adequate legal theory. At its ex-
treme, this feedback loop suggests that an adequate legal theory should
take into account the effect that its particular adoption would have in
all the relevant markets. A theory should thus be self-conscious of its
historical role. I suppose that if we took this criterion seriously, we
would move closer to dialectical thinking-which seems to be one mode
of thought which provides a sophisticated and self-conscious under-
standing of the relation of theory to practice. 144 At any rate, even if
Coase does not impel us to take the dialectical road, he at least cautions
us that the positivist and foundationalist route is a dead end. 145
A second suggestion for legal theory that can be derived from
Coase's article is that we resist deciding what to do by comparing the
existing state of affairs with an idealized projection of that state of af-
fairs. Not only is the idealization of that state of affairs likely to pro-
duce the difficulties posed by the reciprocity of harm and the feedback
loop, but it is likely to create other problems as well. As Coase states:
A second feature of the usual treatment of the problems dis-
cussed in this article is that the analysis proceeds in terms of a
comparison between a state of laissez faire and some kind of
ideal world. This approach inevitably leads to a looseness of
141. We have some big constitutional anniversaries coming up: 1787 and 1791. My guess
is that we will see a lot of symposia, conferences, T.V. shows and general media brouhaha about
the wonderfulness of constitutional rights.
142. The current surge of interest (among legal scholars) in the Republican tradition may
be a reflection of this tension. This tradition offers an image of political community which empha-
sizes connection, collective self-rule, civic virtue and public dialogue. Michelman, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 493 (1986). This yearning for a more enno-
bling vision of political community may well be a response to the products of liberal rights-based
jurisprudence and its emphasis on separateness, autonomy, and self-interest. See Sherry, id.
143. The center liberals' efforts to rationalize the activism of the liberal Warren court by
validating extra-constitutional interpretation and by devaluing conventional interpretive ap-
proaches may be of some use to help out the activist aspirations of Reagan's right-wing judicial
appointments. See Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L. J. 1, 14 (1983) (argu-
ing that judicial self restraint is a contingent, time and place-not an absolute-good).
144. See S. WARREN, supra note 22.
145. For a cogent summary of dialectical theory see, S. WARREN, supra note 22, at 177-98.
See also Cornell, supra note 22. On anti-foundationalism, see supra note 120.
1986:919
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
thought since the nature of the alternative being compared is
never clear.... Actually very little analysis is required to show
that an ideal world is better than a state of laissez faire, unless
the definitions of a state of laissez faire and an ideal world
happen to be the same. But the whole discussion is largely
irrelevant for questions of economic policy since whatever we
may have in mind as our ideal world, it is clear that we have
not yet discovered how to get to it from where we are. 146
Of course, this quote could be read as advising quietism, resignation
and maintenance of the status quo (whatever that is). But, I think Coase
is hinting at something far more powerful and incisive.
Idealized visions lead to the you-can't-get-there-from-here prob-
lem. Ideal normative theory in law (as elsewhere) tends to blind itself to
the normative dilemmas involved in moving from this world to a better
one. Consider, for instance, the "end-state" and "historical principle"
theories of distributive justice. 147 End-state theories (the Rawlsian ap-
proach, for instance) suggest that whether a society is just or not de-
pends upon whether goods and opportunities are allocated in that soci-
ety in conformity with some structural principle of just distribution. 148
One Rawlsian principle, for instance, requires that certain inequalities
be structured so as to redound to the benefit of the least advantaged. 1
49
Historical principle theories, by contrast, require a determination of
whether the process by which entitlements and opportunities have been
gained or transferred is just. Historical principle theories (such as desert
or merit) thus require an examination of the actual historical process by
which entitlements have been acquired.' 50 The important point is that
neither type of theory inquires seriously about what to do when there is
a discrepancy between the actual and the ideal. Of course, they often
make no claims to pursue such inquiries-in fact, they often make
claims that they will not engage in such inquiries. 5 ' But that is the
problem. End-state theories focus their attention on developing an
ideal end-state-but do not indicate how to get there justly. 152 The
question of how redistribution should occur is simply not examined or
146. Coase, supra note 1, at 43.
147. The distinction is borrowed from R. NozICK, supra note 133, at 150-55.
148. Id. at 153.
149. J. RAWLs, supra note 133, at 83, 302 (for various statements of the "difference
principle").
150. R. NOZICK, supra note 133, at 153-55.
151. See infra notes 152 and 155.
152. This question is excluded from the scope of Rawls' work, for instance. J. RAwLs,
supra note 133, at 8. And in some sense it has to be excluded: the attractiveness of an end-state
theory of justice, like Rawls' theory, depends on suppressing historical processes. Once historical
processes surface in the account, it becomes apparent that end state principles cannot tell the
whole (or even the main) story about distributive justice. Cf. R. NoziCK, supra note 133, at 154.
An Appreciative Comment on Coase
not examined with sufficient depth. As for historical principle theories,
they are exceedingly modest on how to correct or repair a historical
process that has gone awry in the distribution of goods. Generally, the
significance of these problems is greatest when the discrepancy between
the ideal and the actual is systemic or total. 
153
The failure of normative theories to give serious consideration to
this problem invites the sort of errors that Coase warned against. For
when one has no guidance as to how to move from an actual world to a
rather distant ideal world, the temptation is to begin reform by repli-
cating at the micro level what the ideal would have us do on the macro
level or more broadly, to move in the direction of the ideal even if we
know we can't get there." 4 Rawls does not make this move, but the
temptation remains. 155
The move is a mistake, because as Coase warned, changes in re-
gimes must be assessed from the perspective of the totality. And from
the perspective of the totality, achievement of the macro-ideal may at
times require doing exactly the opposite of replicating the macro-ideal
at the micro-level. Ideal normative theories do not inexorably lead to
this sort of mistake, but by neglecting the here-to-there dilemma, they
certainly invite the error.
Overall, I think that Coase can be read to offer some powerful sug-
gestions for normative theory. The last contribution he offers is applica-
ble to normative theory as well as to the explicit and implicit theoretical
suppositions and structures that underlie all normative and prescriptive
scholarship in law. By way of shorthand, these suppositions and intel-
lectual structures may be called "conceptualization". I think that con-
ceptualization is a type of regime which imposes its structure on the
153. That is because in those situations, we can't employ our culturally favored approach:
going one step at a time. The Coasian feedback loop poses serious problems for incrementalism if
the problems are systemic or total. Each incremental step changes the total situation.
154. As Leff puts it:
[I]n complex processes [which most social processes are] a move in the right direction is
not necessarily the right move. To pick a simple illustration, if I am on a desert island,
subsisting solely on cocoanuts and oysters and beginning to hate it a lot, and across the
bay from me there is another island, lush and fertile, I do not improve my position in life
by swimming half way across.
Leff, supra note 30, at 476. For another exploration of this "problem of the second best" as it
relates to the practice of law and economics scholarship, see Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8
HoFsTRA L. REv. 641, 652-53 (1980).
155. J. RAwLs, supra note 133, at 7-11, 54, 84. R. Nozick, for instance, recognizes that
Rawls limited the application of his principles to the basic structure of society. R. NoziCK, supra
note 133, at 204-205. And Rawls later articulated more fully his vision of the "basic structure" of
society as the subject of distributive justice. See J. RAwLS, Basic Structure as Subject in VALUES &
MoRALs 47 (1978).
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practice of and the reflection about law. The Coasian insights suggest
an economic approach to conceptualization:
1 56
1. Where conceptualization imposes no transaction costs on the subse-
quent attempts to understand human behavior or to enhance the
social product, the choice of which conceptualization to adopt will
have no impact on the allocation of intellectual resources or the so-
cial product. 5
7
2. Where, however, conceptualization does impose transaction costs
on subsequent attempts to understand human behavior or to en-
hance the social product, the choice of which conceptualization to
adopt will have allocative effects on the deployment of intellectual
resources and will have implications for the social product. In such
cases, one should either:
a. try to eliminate these transaction costs as much as possible by
deconstructing and exposing the mystifying effects of existing
conceptualizations; 158
b. one should attempt to discern the sort of conceptualizations we
would have arrived at in the absence of ideological distortion and
the unreflective commitments of convention. 
159
Of course, these suggestions are not Coase's: they are displaced para-
phrases of what some lawyer-economists have inferred from The Prob-
lem of Social Cost. Perhaps then, the best (or rather, the least awful)
thing to do is to remain loyal to the nihilistic thrust of Coase's article-
in which case, the point is: "In devising and choosing between... (vari-
ous ways of conceptualizing) .... we should have regard for the total
effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am
advocating."1 6 o
156. This approach might be seen as an economy of theoretical conceptualization. There
is nothing particularly shocking or novel in this concept. After all, we already apply aesthetic
criteria to evaluate our normative theories: consistency, sweep, elegance, coherence, etc. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 110 (1979). The relation of
these aesthetic criteria might themselves be considered a certain economics of style. Elegance, for
instance, is little more than an imperative to develop economies of scale. Coherence is achieved by
minimizing the factors of theoretical production used. Sweep is a function of the rate of marginal
substitutability with other theories. And so on.
157. "This is, of course a very unrealistic assumption." Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
158. J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1978).
159. J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984).
160. Coase, supra note I, at 44.
